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INTRODUCTION

In 1976, a dispute erupted between two INTERPOL member
countries regarding the interpretation of Article 3 of INTERPOL's
Constitution, which states that "[i]t is strictly forbidden for the
Organization to undertake any intervention or activities of a political,
military, religious or racial character."' In a passionate speech before2
INTERPOL's General Assembly, the Organization's supreme organ,
the representative of one of the disputing countries stated:
Can we treat Article 3 as lovers treat a daisy, claiming that in
some cases we apply it and in some we do not? The word s-t-r-ic-t-1-y in Article 3 does not allow us to strip off all the petals-or
all the garments from our beautiful and beloved Organization.
* The author works as a Senior Counsel at INTERPOL's Office of Legal Affairs. I
would like to thank my colleagues at the Office of Legal Affairs-in particular Mr. Olivier
Foures and Ms. Lina Monten-for their valuable comments. All errors remain the author's own.
1. Organization-INTERPOL [INTERPOL], ICPO-INTERPOL Constitution, art. 3,
June 13, 1956, available at http://www.interpol.int/About-INTERPOL/Legal-materials/TheConstitution [hereinafter INTERPOL Constitution].
2. See id. art. 6 ("[t]he General Assembly shall be the body of supreme authority in the
Organization. It is composed of delegates appointed by the Members of the Organization").
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Forgive me for saying so, but Article 3 is a sort of chastity belt.3
The rhetorical question posed by the distinguished delegate and his
somewhat provocative statement was clearly intended to highlight the
significance of Article 3 of INTERPOL's Constitution to the
Organization's activities. Indeed, since the Organization's earlier days,
Article 3 has been among the most prominent constitutional provisions,
a cornerstone governing INTERPOL's undertakings.
This Article aims to analyze the developments concerning the
application of Article 3, and the various considerations pertinent to its
interpretation. While Article 3 applies to all INTERPOL activities, in
practice it has been particularly relevant to INTERPOL's activities in
two domains: first, in the field of processing of information related to
police work via INTERPOL's channels; and secondly, in the context of
cooperation with other international entities. This Article will therefore
focus on the application of Article 3 and the different tests applied in
these two domains.
Part II of this Article provides an introduction to Article 3 in the
context of INTERPOL work. Part III examines a number of general
observations regarding the interpretation of Article 3, and Part IV
presents an overview of the relevant Resolutions of INTERPOL's
General Assembly. Part V discusses the four elements enumerated in
Article 3, namely the political, military, religious, and racial elements.
Parts VI and VII then analyze the interpretation and implementation of
Article 3 in INTERPOL's practice: first, in the sphere of processing of
information; and secondly, in the context of cooperation with other
international entities.

II. ARTICLE 3 IN CONTEXT
INTERPOL was created in 1923 as the International Criminal Police
Commission (ICPC), with its headquarters in Vienna, Austria.4 When its
current Constitution was adopted in 1956, the Organization's name was
changed to "The International Criminal Police OrganizationINTERPOL," and its seat was established in France.5 The Organization
has 188 member countries, 6 and hence enjoys almost universal
membership. As the world's largest international police organization,
3. See INTERPOL General Assembly of 1976 (minutes) (on file with author).
4. See INTERPOL, History, available at http://www.interpol.int/About-INTERPOL/
History.
5. INTERPOL Constitution, supra note 1, art. 1.
6. See INTERPOL, Home, available at http://www.interpol.int/Member-countries/
World (last visited Oct. 5, 2011).
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INTERPOL aims to facilitate cross-border police cooperation and
support, and to assist all organizations, authorities, and services whose
mission is to prevent or combat international crime. To ensure
cooperation, each member country designates a national body, called
the National Central Bureau (NCB), which ensures a liaison with the
various departments in the countr, NCBs in other countries, and the
Organization's General Secretariat.
The creation of the Organization as an international commission
established by representatives of national law enforcement agencies has
raised doubts concerning the legal status of the Organization under
international law. Indeed, it has been argued in the past that INTERPOL
is a private organization of police officers, or a non-governmental
organization.9 Nonetheless, there should be little doubt today that
INTERPOL enjoys the status of an independent international
organization.* 10
7. For further information about INTERPOL's vision and mission, see INTERPOL,
Overview, availableat http://www.interpol.int/About-INTERPOL/Overview.
8. INTERPOL Constitution, supra note 1, art. 32.
9. See Henry G. Shcermers, The International Organizations, in INTERNATIONAL LAW:
ACHIEVEMENTS AND PROSPECTS 68 (Mohammed Bedjaoui ed., 1991). Cf MICHAEL FOONER,
INTERPOL: ISSUES IN WORLD CRIME AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 45-47 (Plenem

Press 1989).
10. A full discussion of INTERPOL's legal status under international law exceeds the
scope of this Article. See generally RUTSEL SYLVESTER J. MARTHA, THE LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF

INTERPOL (2010). It is sufficient to mention the following indicators attesting to its legal status
under international law: 1) In 1975, INTERPOL was designated as an intergovernmental
organization for the purpose of participating in the work of the U.N. Economic and Social
Council. NIELS M. BLOKKER & HENRY G. SCHERMERES, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW 29

(4th ed. 2003). This status was confirmed in a study carried out in 1982 by the U.N. Office of
Legal Affairs. Status of the International CriminalPolice Organization (INTERPOL) with the
United Nations, 1982 U.N.Y.B. 179, available at http://untreaty.un.org/cod/UNJuridical
Yearbook/html/volumes/1982/dtSearch/SearchForms/dtSearch.html (follow "179" hyperlink).
2) INTERPOL is a party to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Between States and
International Organizations or Between International Organizations. ICPO-INTERPOL,
Accession to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Between States and International
Organizationsor Between InternationalOrganizations(1986), Gen. Ass. Res. AGN/69/RES/7
(2000), complied in INTERPOL, Resolutions: 69th Session-Rhodes-30 October-4 November
2000 (Not yet in force) [hereinafter INTERPOL Accession to the Vienna Convention] (on file
with author). INTERPOL has concluded a significant number of cooperation agreements with
other international organizations, by which they recognized INTERPOL as an international
organization. See also INTERPOL, Agreements with Other International Organizations,
available at http://www.interpol.int/About-INTERPOL/Legal-materials/International-Cooperat
ion-Agreements, 3) INTERPOL has concluded headquarters agreements with a number of host
countries (e.g., France). See INTERPOL, HeadquartersAgreements, available at http://www.
interpol.int/About-INTERPOL/Legal-materials/Fundamental-texts. These agreements contain
principles akin to headquarters agreements of other international organizations (e.g., privileges
and immunities). Id. at 4. INTERPOL, as an international organization, has recognized the
jurisdiction of the Administrative Tribunal of the International Labor Organization (ILOAT).
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INTERPOL's aims are defined in Article 2 of INTERPOL's
Constitution as follows:
(1) To ensure and promote the widest possible mutual assistance
between all criminal police authorities within the limits of the
laws existing in the different countries and in the spirit of the
"Universal Declaration of Human Rights";
(2) To establish and develop all institutions likely to contribute
effectively to the prevention and suppression of ordinary law
crimes.11
Thus, in accordance with Article 2, it is within the fields of
international criminal law and international criminal justice that
INTERPOL carries out its activities. The terminology used in Article 2
enables broad interpretations, and thus the possibility to confront new
challenges without the need to resort to amendments of the
Organization's legal framework. Based on the general guidance
provided for in Article 2, INTERPOL has defined its strategic priorities
as follows: first, creating a secure global communication network
(called 1-24/7), which enables the processing of police information and
requests for police cooperation among INTERPOL's NCBs and with the
General Secretariat; secondly, providing 24/7 support to policing and
law enforcement; thirdly, capacity building; and fourthly, assisting
member countries in the identification of crimes and criminals.
Among the tools and services that INTERPOL provides are operation
data services and databases for police such as fingerprints and DNA
databases.13 INTERPOL also publishes notifications known as
INTERPOL Notices. These are international alerts allowing police in
member countries to share critical crime-related information. They are
published and circulated by INTERPOL's General Secretariat upon the
request of an NCB or an international entity (e.g., an international
tribunal) with which the Organization has concluded a cooperation

See, e.g., Judgment of the Int'l Labor Org. Trib., No. 1080, at 1, (1991), available at
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/triblex/triblexmain.fullText?p_lang-en&pjudgmentno=1080&pang
uage code=EN (recognizing the legal status of INTERPOL as an international organization). 5)
INTERPOL's status as an international organization has been recognized by national authorities.
Cf Exec. Order 12425, 48 Fed. Reg. 28069 (June 16, 1983) (according to which U.S. law on
privileges and immunities granted to international organizations shall apply to INTERPOL).
11. INTERPOL Constitution, supra note 1, art. 2.
12. See INTERPOL, Priorities, available at http://www.interpol.int/About-INTERPOL/
Priorities (last visited Oct. 5, 2011).
13. See INTERPOL, databases, available at http://www.interpol.int/en/INTERPOLexpertise/Databases.
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agreement.14 The most well known of INTERPOL's notifications is the
red notice, which is a request to provisionally arrest a wanted person
pending extradition.' 5 INTERPOL also publishes alerts of imminent
threats (the orange notice), requests to assist in the location of a missing
person (the yellow notice) and more.
From its earliest days on, INTERPOL has maintained a position of
neutrality. As stated by INTERPOL's President in 1946, by adhering to
this principle, the Organization "had succeeded in gaining the respect of
administrative and judicial authorities in all member countries."' 7 In
1948, the phrase "to the strict exclusion of all matters having a political,
religious or racial character" was added to the end of Article 1(1) of the
Organization's Statute, which defined the Organization's purposes.
Despite the fact that the drafters of the 1956 Constitution chose to
divide the former Article 1(1) into two separate provisions, namely
Article 2 and Article 3, it appears that conceptually and structurally the
two provisions should be read together, as their combination forms
INTERPOL's scope of activities, namely its rule of speciality.' 9 This
14. See INTERPOL, Notices, available at http://www.interpol.intlen/INTERPOLexpertise/Notices [hereinafter Notices]. The legal definition of Notices reads as follows:
"Notices mean international Interpol notifications containing sets of information recorded in the
police information system and circulated by the General Secretariat, for purposes referred to in
Article 3.1(a) below." See Article 1(1) of the Rules on the Processing of Information for the
Purposes of International Police Co-operation, available at http://www.interpol.intlen/AboutINTERPOL/Legal-materials [hereinafter RPI].
15. See Article 37(a)1.i of the Implementing Rules of the Rules on the Processing of
Information for the Purposes of International Police Co-operation, available at http://www.
interpol.int/en/About-INTERPOL/Legal-materials [hereinafter Implementing Rules].
16. See Notices, supra note 14.
17. See opening speech made by INTERPOL's President Mr. Louwage at the Brussels
Conference in 1946 (on file with author). This Conference led to the rebuilding of the
Organization following World War II.
18. See INTERPOL, Neutrality (Article 3 of the Constitution), available at
http://www.interpol.int/en/About-INTERPOL/Legal-materials/Neutrality-Article-3-of-the-Con
stitution. The Organization's Statute was first adopted in 1923. In 1946, as part of the rebuilding
of the Organization following World War II, a new Statute was adopted. In 1956, INTERPOL's
General Assembly adopted the Organization's Constitution, which governs INTERPOL's
activities to the present days. See INTERPOL, Constitution, supra note 1, and INTERPOL,
History, at http://www.interpol.int/About-INTERPOL/History.
19. See id. International organizations must conduct their activities within the mandate
defined by their creators. As explained by the International Court of Justice (ICJ):
[I]nternational organizations are subjects of international law which do not,
unlike States, possess a general competence. International organizations are
governed by the "principle of specialty," that is to say, they are invested by the
States which create them with powers, the limits of which are a function of the
common interests whose promotion those States entrust to them.
Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, 1996 I.C.J. 226,
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position is supported also by certain INTERPOL General Assembly
resolutions, such as the resolution approving cooperation with the
International Criminal Court. The preamble of the resolution states that
the crimes under the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court
"fall within the aims of the Organization as defined in Articles 2 and 3
of the Constitution." 20
Thus, INTERPOL's activities should be understood to encompass
any undertaking that can promote international police cooperation, so
long as such an undertaking conforms with three restrictions: firstly, it
is performed within the limits of the pertinent national laws;21 secondly,
it is conducted "in the spirit of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights;" 22 and finally, it is not of a political, military, religious or racial
character within the meaning of Article 3 of the Constitution.23

III. THE INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 3:

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

Prior to delving into a discussion concerning the interpretation of
Article 3 in light of INTERPOL's rules and practice, three general
questions merit consideration: first, the applicable principles of
interpretation under international law which guides the interpretation of
Article 3; secondly, differences between the versions of Article 3 in the
three official languages of INTERPOL's Constitution; and thirdly, the
interrelation between Article 3 and the concept of "ordinary law

crime."24
A. The Applicable PrinciplesofInterpretation
The general principles of treaty interpretation are laid out in Articles
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/95/7495.pdf. See also The Secretary-General,
Comments and Observations of the Office of Legal Affairs on the draft Articles on Responsibility
of International Organizations, adopted by the International Law Commission on the first
reading in 2009, 2, delivered to the Security Council and the General Assembly, U.N. Doc
A/CN.4/637/Add.l
(Feb. 2011), available at http://untreaty.un.org/ola/UNComments
onRIO.pdf.
20. See ICC Corporate Agreement.
21. INTERPOL Constitution, supra note 1, art 2(1).
22. Id. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., Ist plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948), available at http://www.un.org/events/
humanrights/udhr6O/hrphotos/declaration%20 eng.pdf (Unlike the other two restrictions
regarding INTERPOL's scope of activities (namely the limitation of national laws and Article
3), this requirement can also be construed as embodying a positive instruction, namely that
INTERPOL should be encouraged to engage in activities which can promote the "spirit of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights").
23. See INTERPOL Constitution, supra note 1, art. 3.
24. See id. art. 2.
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31-33 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 25 which
has been recognized as reflecting customary international law. 26 The
Vienna Convention defines a "treaty" for its purpose as an
"international agreement concluded between States."2 7 The Convention
applies also to a treaty which "is the constituent instrument of an
and defines an "international
international organization,"8
organization" as an "intergovernmental organization." 2 9 Considering
that the legal character of INTERPOL's Constitution has often been
questioned, oa doubt may arise as to whether the principles of
interpretation enshrined in the Vienna Convention apply with regard to
INTERPOL's Constitution.
Nonetheless, as noted earlier, INTERPOL should be considered as
an independent international organization, and this author concurs with
the view according to which "INTERPOL's Constitution is a product of
an agreement establishing an international organi[z]ation under
international law." 3 1 In addition, INTERPOL has accessed to the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International
Organizations or between International Organizations,32 which applies
interpretive principles identical to the 1969 Vienna Convention.3 3
Consequently, it is safe to assert that the interpretation of INTERPOL's
Constitution, including of Article 3 of the Constitution, is guided by the
interpretation tenets embodied in the Vienna Convention, notably the
principle according to which "[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good
faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms
25. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, arts. 31-33, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331, available at http://untreaty.un.org/ ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1_1_1969.pdf
[hereinafter Vienna Convention].
26. See Territorial Dispute (Libya v. Chad), 1994 I.C.J. 354, T 41, translated at
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/83/6897.pdf. See also IAN ROBERTSON SINCLAIR, VIENNA
CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 185-86 (2d ed. 1984).
27. Vienna Convention, supra note 25, art. 2.
28. Id. art. 5.
29. Id. art. 2.
30.

See MARTHA, supranote 10, at 1-2.

31. See id. at 4. See also BLOKKER & SCHERMERES, supra note 10, at 29, who concluded
that while "[flormally, Interpol is not based on an agreement between states[,] ... such an
agreement may be in fact deduced from a number of factors[, such as,] in 1975 it was designated
as an intergovernmental organization to participate in the work of ECOSOC on a continuing
basis. ... "
32. INTERPOL's accession to the 1986 Vienna Convention was approved by
INTERPOL's General Assembly. See INTERPOL Accession to the Vienna Convention, supra
note 10. According to the Resolution's preamble, INTERPOL's member countries consider the
Organization as an "intergovernmental organization" in the meaning of that Convention:
"[b]earing in mind that the ICPO-Interpol has the capacity to conclude treaties and that it is
recognized as an intergovernmental organization as specified in Article 2(1)(i) of the 1986
Vienna Convention and under the rules of international law ..... Id.
33. Vienna Convention, supra note 25, arts. 31-33.
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of the treaty in their context and in light of its objects and purpose." 34
B. The Diference Between the English, French and Spanish
Versions ofArticle 3
Another general question pertains to the differences in the versions
of Article 3 in its three authoritative languages-French, English, and
Spanish. The English version prescribes that "[i]t is strictly forbidden
for the Organization to undertake any intervention or activities of a
political, military, religious or racial character," 36 while the French
version states that "[t]oute activit6 ou intervention dans des questions ou
affaires prdsentant un caractbre politique, militaire, religieux ou racial
est rigouresusement interdite A l'Organisation." 37 Thus, the English
version appears to relate to the activities of the Organization itself,
while the French version concerns matters which the Organization
might be asked to engage in. The Spanish version, which reads "[e]std
rigurosamente prohibida a la Organizaci6n toda actividad o intervenci6n
en cuestiones o asuntos de caricter politico, militar, religioso o racial,"
38
appears to be closer to the French version.
The application of general interpretative principles regarding treaties
authenticated in more than one language 3 9 leads to the conclusion that
the French version should govern with regard to this question of
interpretation. INTERPOL was established for the purposes of
providing services to police authorities around the world, thus it is the
matters in which it is asked to support national authorities which should
not be of a political, military, religious or racial character. Resolutions
adopted by INTERPOL's General Assembly further support this
position: those resolutions refer to the prohibition set forth by Article 3
with regard to requests for cooperation sent by INTERPOL's member
countries via INTERPOL's channels, and require the General
34. Idart.31(1).
35. INTERPOL Constitution, supra note 1, art. 43. The French version was the original
language when the Constitution was adopted. In addition to the three authoritative languages
(French, English, and Spanish), Arabic is the fourth working language of INTERPOL. See
General Regulations art. 54(1).
36. Id. art. 3.
37. INTERPOL, O.I.P.C.-INTERPOL Statut et R~glement, June 13, 1956, art. 3,
available at http://www.interpol.int/fr/A-propos-d'INTERPOL/Documents-juridiques/Fundame
ntal-texts (A literal translation of the French version of Article 3 will read as follows: "Any
activity or involvement by the Organization in questions or matters of a political, military,
religious or racial nature is strictly forbidden.").
38. INTERPOL, Estatuto y Reglamento General de la OIPC, June 13, 1956, art. 3,
available at http://www.itnerpol.intles/Acerca-de-INTERPOL/Documentaci6n-jur/C3%ADd
ica (A literal translation of the French versi6n of Article 3 will read similarly to the French
version of Article 3. See supra note 37).
39. See Vienna Convention, supra note 25, art. 33.
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Secretariat, as the jrimary organ responsible for the daily operation of
the Organization, to assess each request based on the particular facts
provided on a case-by-case basis. 4 1 The resolutions therefore concern
the possible application of Article 3 with regard to requests for
cooperation, which encompasses the matters in which the Organization
may become involved.
Moreover, a different interpretation, namely that Article 3 applies
with regard to the activities of the Organization itself, that is, taking a
literal interpretation of the English version, might theoretically imply
that other entities would not be bound by the restrictions imposed by
Article 3 when using the Organization's tools and services. Consider,
for example, a situation where a member country sends directly to
another member country via INTERPOL's channels a message of pure
religious character, or a situation where during an INTERPOL
conference a delegate representing one of INTERPOL's member
countries carries out a political speech. In both cases, it is not the
Organization's organs which directly undertook an activity in violation
of Article 3, yet it would seem inconceivable to argue that the activities
described above fall outside the scope of that provision. Conversely, the
approach embodied in the French version, according to which it is the
subject matter that determines whether the particular activity or
undertaking that the Organization is requested to support is sanctioned
by Article 3, will lead to the more reasonable interpretation applying
Article 3 in the above examples.
Finally, in the domain of collaboration with other international
entities, a prerequisite for any use of INTERPOL's services and tools by
these international entities, for instance for the purposes of having
access to INTERPOL's information network and databases, is that this
use is in conformity with Article 3. The question of whether cooperation
is allowed in light of Article 3 is also determined by examining the
subject matter of the proposed cooperation.4 2
In conclusion, it appears that the French version of Article 3 should
apply.43 Thus, whether a particular activity falls within the scope of
Article 3 is determined by the subject-matter of this activity, and all
entities-whether the Organization's organs, its member countries, or
other international or national entities-are bound by Article 3 upon
using INTERPOL's tools and services, and when participating in the

40. INTERPOL Constitution, supra notel, art. 26.
41. See Part IV, discussion.
42. See Part VII.
43. In that reference, see also James Sheptycki, stating that "in practice it is the French
version which seems to be operative." James Sheptycki, The Accountability of Transnational
PolicingInstitutions: The Strange Case ofInterpol, 19 CAN. J.L. & Soc'Y 107, 128 (2004).
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Organization's activities.4
C. The InterrelationBetween Article 3 and the Concept of "Ordinary
Law Crime"
The term "ordinary law crime" is explicitly mentioned in
INTERPOL's Constitution, notably in the aforementioned Article 2(2),
as well as in Article 26(b), which defines one of the functions of the
General Secretariat as being "[to] 4s]erve as an international centre in
the fight against ordinary crime." Nonetheless, it has been correctly
indicated that "the concept of 'ordinary law crime' is important[,] but its
meaning is by no means clear-cut."46
In INTERPOL's practice, Article 3 serves to define the scope of this
concept: thus, "ordinary law crime" means crimes that do not fall within
the scope of Article 3.47 This interrelation between the concept of
"ordinary law crime" and Article 3 supports the argument presented
above regarding Articles 2 and 3 of the Constitution being read together
for the purpose of defining INTERPOL's rule of specialty. Moreover,
this link has enabled the shaping of the scope of INTERPOL's activities
not by interpreting Article 2 of the Constitution, but rather through the
evolution in the interpretation of Article 3. For example, in 1994 when
INTERPOL's General Assembly considered the question whether the
Organization should get involved in the field of fighting serious
international crimes (genocide, crimes against humanity, and war
crimes), the debate focused less on the meaning of the term "ordinary
44. MARTHA, supra note 10, at 43 (indicating that the restriction laid down by Article 3
"apply both to the General Secretariat and to INTERPOL members").
45. INTERPOL Constitution, supra note 1, art. 26(b).
46. Sheptycki, supra note 43. The terms "ordinary law crime" and "common crimes" are
frequently used interchangeably. One scholar describes "common crimes" as follows:
Throughout the history of mankind, organized societies have characterized
certain forms of behavior as offensive to their common morality. These forms
of behavior have invariably included that which harmfully affects a commonly
shared interest, perceived by almost every member of society, irrespective of
ideology. Among these have been certain acts affecting the life and physical
integrity of individuals, which, by virtue of their consistent recognition in the
legal controls of almost all social systems, are referred to as "common crimes.
M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAW AND PRACTICE 656

(5th ed. 2007).
47. Compare this with the context of the processing of police information via
INTERPOL's channels, where Article 3 is of particular importance, "ordinary law crimes" are
defined as "crimes as referred to in Article 2(b) of the Constitution but not those excluded by
Article 3 of the said Constitution." See RPI, supra note 14, art. 1(a).
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law crime" in Article 2 of the Constitution, and more on the application
of Article 3 in that context. 4 8 By concluding that, a priori, Article 3
does not prevent the Organization from collaboration in this field,
INTERPOL's General Assembly in fact enabled the broadening of
INTERPOL's activities in the promotion of international police
cooperation in the meaning of Article 2 of the Constitution.4 9

IV. INTERPOL's GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS
CONCERNING ARTICLE 3
INTERPOL's General Assembly has addressed the question of the
interpretation of Article 3 in a number of its resolutions. General
Assembly resolutions are the decisions of INTERPOL's supreme organ
adopted in its plenary session,50 namely by a vote of the delegates of
member countries.s1 The resolutions are therefore particularly relevant
for the interpretation of Article 3 in view of the interpretive principles
set forth by the Vienna Convention, as they reflect "subsequent
agreement[s] between the parties regarding the interpretation of the
treaty or the application of its provisions." 52
The General Assembly adopted the first pertinent resolution in
195 1. The impetus for the resolution was a dispute that arose over the
publication of red notices upon the request of Czechoslovakia against
Czechoslovakian nationals charged with hijacking a plane in March
1950 and forcing it to land in an American airbase in West Germany.
The individuals were granted political asylum in the United States,
which argued that INTERPOL should not have issued the notices in
light of the prohibition against engaging in political matters.
INTERPOL's General Secretariat did not concur with the position of
the United States, and allowed the publication of the notices.
Consequently, the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), which
was the police body that represented the United States in INTERPOL,
withdrew from the activities of the Organization.5 4
The 1951 Resolution recommended to member countries to see that:
[N]o request for information, Notice of persons wanted and,
48. See INTERPOL General Assembly Resolution AGN/63/RES/9 (on file with author).
49. See infra, section IV for a further discussion on the 1994 INTERPOL General
Assembly resolution.
50. INTERPOL Constitution, supra note 1, art. 17.
51. Id. arts. 6, 13.
52. See Vienna Convention, supra note 25, art. 31(3)(a).
53. See INTERPOL, Background to Article 3, supra note 17.
54. See FOONER, supra note 9, at 24, 41; see also Sheptycki, supra note 43, at 128-29;
MARTHA, supra note 10, at 62.
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above all, no request for provisional arrest for offen[s]es of a
predominantly political, racial or religious character, is ever sent
to the International Bureau or the [NCB]s, even if-in the
requesting country-the facts amount to an offen[s]e against the
ordinary law[.]5s
The Resolution therefore applied the predominance test used in
international extradition law, according to which extradition may be
granted if the act for which extradition is requested constitutes primarily
a common crime, even though the individual alleges a political motive
or end.5 6 The test is based on the distinction between "pure offenses"
and "relative offenses."57 The former are considered non-extraditable
offenses, as they refer to acts criminalized solely due to their political or
military nature, and they contain no ordinary law element.5 They are
usually directed against the sovereign, and exclusively affect the public
interest and cause only public wrong.5 9 Typical examples of such
offenses are treason, espionage, and desertion. 60 Relative offenses, on
the other hand, are acts that also include ordinary law elements,
therefore also affecting private interests and causing, at least in part, a
private wrong.6 1
Most importantly, the 1951 Resolution provided that the
Organization will not be bound by the categorization of an offence in
the requesting country as an ordinary law crime; rather, as deriving
from the Resolution, the Organization conducts its own examination on
a case-by-case basis and in a plication of the predominance principle to
assess the nature of the case.
As international law evolved, so did the practice of INTERPOL in
reference to the interpretation and application of Article 3. The first
significant change made via the adoption of General Assembly
resolutions addressed cases of terrorism.6 3 Traditionally, requests for
55. INTERPOL, G.A. Res. AGN/20/RES/11 (1951) (emphasis added) [hereinafter 1951
Resolution] (on file with author).
56.

See GEOFF GILBERT, RESPONDING TO INTERNATIONAL CRIME 218-19 (2006).

57. See Lloyd Grooms & Jane Samson, International Law-The Political Offense
Exception to Extradition: A 19th Century BritishStandardin 20th Century American Courts, 59
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1005, 1009 (1984).

58. See id.
59. Id.
60. Sunil Kumar Gupta, Sanctum for the War Criminal: Extradition Law & the
InternationalCriminal Court, 3 CAL. CRIM. L. REv. 1, 103 (2000).
61. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 46, at 660-62.
62. See MARTHA, supra note 10, at 43.
63.

For a general review on INTERPOL and counter-terrorism, see also Mathieu Deflem,

InternationalProcesses: Global Rule ofLaw or Global Rule ofLaw Enforcement? International
Police Cooperation and Counter-terrorism,Annals of the American Academy of Political and
Social Science, 603 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sa. 240, 245-49 (2006).
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police cooperation related to terrorism were viewed as falling under
Article 3 due to the political motivations of the perpetrators and the
difficulty of drawing a clear and universally acceptable distinction
between "terrorists" and "freedom fighters."
During the 1970s, in light of the increase in terrorist acts such as
hostage taking and the international conventions adopted to combat
such acts,64 INTERPOL's General Assembly adopted a number of
resolutions addressing those crimes.65 The resolutions, while mindful of
Article 3 of the Constitution,66 considered certain acts of violence as a
danger to public safety, and therefore recommended international
cooperation within the framework provided by INTERPOL. The
resolutions stopped short, however, of categorizing such acts of
violence as terrorist acts and analyzing them in light of Article 3 of the
Constitution.
In 1983, INTERPOL's General Assembly requested the Executive
Committee to examine the possibility of drawing up guidelines on how
Article 3 should be interpreted in connection with international
terrorism. A year later, based on the preparatory work done by the
delegates to an international symposium dedicated to this question, the
General Assembly adopted two resolutions directly concerning
terrorism and the interpretation of Article 3.67 The first noted that in
many countries there are organized groups engaging in violent criminal
activities designed, by spreading terror or fear, to enable them to attain
allegedly political objectives; and that such activities, typically
including acts such as kidnappin and hostage taking, are commonly
covered by the term "terrorism." The General Assembly referred to
international conventions covering such matters,69 mentioning that those
conventions do not admit exceptions for political reasons in extradition
cases where certain serious crimes have been committed in the context
64. See, e.g., Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil
Aviation ("Montreal Convention"), Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 565, availableat http://treaties.un.
org/doc/db/Terrorism/Conv3-english.pdf.
65. See, e.g., INTERPOL, Safeguarding of International Civil Aviation, AGN/43/Res/3
(Sept. 19-25, 1974) [hereinafter 1974 Aviation Resolution] (on file with author), and Acts of
Violence Committed by Organized Groups, AGN/48/Res/8 (Sept. 4-11, 1979) [hereinafter 1979
Organized Groups Resolution] (on file with author).
66. See 1979 Organized Groups Resolution, supra note 65.
67. See INTERPOL, Violent Crime Commonly Referred to as Terrorism, AGN/53/Res/6
(Sept. 4-11, 1984) [hereinafter 1984 Terrorism Resolution] (on file with author); Application of
Article 3 of the Constitution, AGN/53/Res/7 (Sept. 4-11, 1984) [hereinafter 1984 Application of
Article 3 Resolution] (on file with author).
68. 1984 Terrorism Resolution, supra note 67.
69. Id. The Resolution explicitly referred to the European Convention on the Suppression
of Terrorism; the Organization of American States' Convention to prevent and punish acts of
terrorism, and the League of Arab States' Extradition Convention.
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of terrorism. The General Assembly further acknowledged that "by
virtue of the principle of national sovereignty, the political character of
any offen[s]e can only be determined by national legislation," but that
"it is nonetheless essential to combat this type of crime which causes
considerable damage in [INTERPOL] Member States[.]" 7 0 The General
Assembly therefore requested that "[t]he NCBs, while respecting the
provisions of Article 3 of the Organization's Constitution, to co-operate
[sic] as fully as possible to combat terrorism as far as their national laws
permits." 7 1
The second 1984 resolution did not make an explicit reference to the
term terrorism, yet by defining the general principles for the
interpretation of Article 3 paved the way-together with the first
Resolution-for the Organization's active participation in the counterterrorism field.7 2 The resolution specified that "[w]hen offenses are
committed with definite political motives[,]" but nonetheless have "no
direct connection with the political life of the offenders' country or the
cause for which they are fighting, the crime may no longer be deemed
to come within the scope of Article 3.",73 "This is particularly true when
offen[s]es are committed in countries which are not directly involved
(i.e., outside the "conflict area")[,] and when the offenis]es constitute a
serious threat to personal freedom, life[,] or property." 7
The resolution clarified that "[o]ffenses [such as aircraft hijacking]
committed outside the conflict area ... in order to draw attention to a
particular cause, do not come within the scope of Article 3." It further
indicated that in general, "a valid criterion is whether there is anything
to connect the victims directly or indirectly with the aims or objectives
pursued by the offenders, and with the countries in the conflict area or
with the relevant political situation." 76
Thus, while some of the qualifying criteria defined by the
resolution-notably the general criterion concerning links (or their lack
thereof) to the "conflict area" and between the offenders' aims and their
victims-might be considered somewhat obsolete today, the resolution
nonetheless enabled INTERPOL's involvement in combating terrorism.
Pursuant to that development, and in response to a number of terrorist
attacks that took place in the 1990s, the fight against international
terrorism became one of INTERPOL's primary aims,77 a position the
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See 1984 Application of Article 3 Resolution, supra note 67.
73. Id. at II.3.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 11.4.
76. Id. at II.5.
77. See INTERPOL, Cairo Declaration Against Terrorism, AGN/67/Res/12 (Oct. 22-27,
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organization confirmed following 9/11.78
With reference to the principles governing the interpretation of
Article 3, the 1984 Application of Article 3 resolution recalled the
predominance test established by the 1951 Resolution, and emphasized
that each request requires review on a case-by-case basis with due
consideration for the specific context.7 9 Notwithstanding this general
approach, the resolution enumerated a number of offenses considered
by their very nature to be of political, military, religious or racial in
character.so
Another important principle established by the resolution concerns
refusals of one or more countries to act on a request.8 1 The resolution
determined that this "does not mean that the request itself is invalid and
that it automatically falls under Article 3 . . . .82 However, if certain
countries refuse extradition, this is reported to all other member
countries for information and consideration. 83 This approach represents
a fundamental tenet governing international police cooperation, namely
the principle of national sovereignty. Thus, so long as the request does
not violate INTERPOL's rules (e.g., a request to arrest a person for
allegedly committing a pure political crime), it may be processed via the
Organization's channels and the decision whether to cooperate remains
within the discretion of each member country in accordance with its
national laws and international obligations. 84 The role of INTERPOL's
1998) (on file with author); INTERPOL, The Financing of Terrorism, AGN/68/Res/2 (Nov. 812, 1999) (on file with author), where the General Assembly stated that it "AGREES that the
fight against international terrorism is one of the main aims of INTERPOL's action in carrying
out its general activities of police co-operation[.]"
78. See INTERPOL, Terrorist Attack of 11 Sept. 2001, AG-2001-Res-05 (Sept. 24-28,
2001) (on file with author).
79. 1984 Application of Article 3 Resolution, supra note 67, at 1.2-3.
80. According to the 1984 Application of Article 3 Resolution,
Some of the acts included as offences in various national penal codes are by
their very nature political, military, religious or racial (e.g. membership of a
prohibited organization, the expression of certain prohibited opinions, offences
involving the press, insulting the authorities, offences against the internal or
external security of the State, desertion from the armed forces, treason,
espionage, practising a prohibited religion, recruitment or propaganda for
particular religions, membership of a racial association). Such acts come within
the scope of Article 3.
Id. at 11.1.
8 1. Id. at I.9.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. INTERPOL's rules make specific references to the obligation of member countries to
act in accordance with their national laws and international obligations. See INTERPOL
Constitution, supra note 1, arts. 2(1), 9, & 31; see also RPI, supra note 14, art. 10.1a.5.
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General Secretariat following the examination of each request and the
approval of its processing is to provide member countries with all
available and pertinent information, which will enable them to decide
whether and to what extent they wish to cooperate.8 5
The last notable resolution concerning the application of Article 3 in
the counter-terrorism field was adopted by INTERPOL's General
Assembly in 2004.86 The resolution endorsed the interim measures
taken by the General Secretariat to enable cooperation in reference to
the crime of membership in a terrorist organization.8 As indicated in
the resolution, until November 2003 the General Secretariat declined
the publication of red notices if they were based solely on this crime.8 8
This policy derived from the application of the 1984 Resolution, which
considered "membership of a prohibited organization" as political by its
very nature.89 In the aftermath of 9/11 and the ensuing terrorist attacks
in Spain and the United Kingdom, INTERPOL's General Assembly
sought to broaden the scope of INTERPOL's involvement in combating
terrorism by allowing cooperation, under certain conditions, with
requests concerning this crime.
Another significant change with regard to the evolution of Article
3's interpretive framework was introduced in 1994 when an INTERPOL
General Assembly resolution (1994 Resolution) adopted the contents of
an INTERPOL report, which recommended that collaboration with the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
should be allowed. 90 The 1994 Resolution therefore enabled cooperation
in cases concerning serious international crimes (genocide, crimes
against humanity, and war crimes), which were previously considered to
fall under Article 3 in light of the intrinsic political (and sometimes

85. This role of the General Secretariat is based on its function as "an international centre
in the fight against ordinary crime" and as a "technical and information centre." See INTERPOL
Constitution, supra note 1, arts. 26(b), 26(c).
86. INTERPOL, Interim Guidance to the General Secretariat in Cases of Membership in
a Terrorist Organization, AG-2004-Res- 18 (Oct. 05-08, 2004) (on file with author).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. INTERPOL, 1984 Application of Article 3 Resolution, supra note 67, at 11.1.
90. INTERPOL, Report AGN/63/RAP/13 (1994) [hereinafter 1994 Report], adopted by
Application of Article 3 of the Constitution in the Context [of] Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law, AGN/63/Res/9 (Sept. 28-Oct. 04, 1994) [hereinafter 1994
Resolution] (on file with author). This resolution opened the way for cooperation with other
international tribunals: INTERPOL's General Assembly approved cooperation with the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda [ICTR] in 1997 (Resolution AGN/66/RES/10);
cooperation with the Special Court for Sierra Leone in 2003 (Resolution AG-2003-RES-08);
and cooperation with the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 2004 (Resolution AG-2004RES-16) [hereinafter Cooperation Agreement with the ICC] (the abovementioned resolutions
are on file with author).
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military) elements they contain. 9 1 The report analyzed the various
elements of Article 3 and reiterated the principle that each request for
cooperation has to be evaluated individually by examining the facts. 92 it
further elaborated on the interpretation of Article 3 by clarifying certain
points such as the review of cases concerning crimes committed by
politicians.9 3
In addition to the three important resolutions addressing directly the
interpretation of Article 3, namely the 1951, the 1984, and the 1994
Resolutions, a number of other resolutions referring to Article 3 are
worth noting. These include a resolution adopted in 2006, which
mentioned Article 3 among the Constitutional provisions attesting to the
Organization's independence and neutrality, thereby underscoring one
of the important objectives of Article 3;94 and resolutions approving
cooperation agreements with other international entities such as with the
International Criminal Court, which made important references to
Article 3.9'

This overview of INTERPOL's General Assembly resolutions
manifests that the primary objectives of Article 3 may be defined as
follows: firstly, to ensure the independence and neutrality of
INTERPOL as an international police organization;96 secondly, to
reflect established principles of international extradition law; and
thirdly, to protect individuals from persecution.
In addition, the following points are noteworthy: INTERPOL, as an
independent international organization, has developed its own
guidelines concerning the interpretation of Article 3. Secondly, the
Organization has adopted the predominance test for the purpose of
evaluating requests for police cooperation in light of Article 3. Thirdly,
each case has to be assessed separately, taking into account all relevant
elements. Finally, the general direction has clearly been towards the
91. See 1994 Resolution, supra note 90.
92. See 1994 Report, supra note 90.
93. See infra Part VI.
94. INTERPOL, Statement to Reaffirm the Independence & Political Neutrality of
Interpol, AG-2006-Res-04 (Sept. 19-22, 2006) (on file with author) [hereinafter Statement to
Reaffirm the Independence & Political Neutrality].
95. See Cooperation Agreement with the ICC, supra note 90. See also infra Parts VI &
VII.
96. It was correctly indicated that "de-politicization" is among the important imperatives
ensuring international police cooperation, and INTERPOL's ability to enforce this imperative
has been the main source of its success. See Mario Savino, Global Administrative Law Meets
"Soft" Powers: The uncomfortable Case of INTERPOL Red Notices 43 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &
POL. (2010). The author argued, however, that "the assumption that INTERPOL's ends are not
politically biased but (merely) functionally oriented . . . is now under threat because of the
inclusion of terrorism-related crimes in INTERPOL mandate," and that INTERPOL cannot be
really apolitical because no institution can be. Id. at 18-19.
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narrowing of the application of Article 3 with regard to the nature of the
offense, notably through the exclusion of the crime of terrorism and
serious international crimes from the ambit of Article 3. This shift in
INTERPOL's practice reflects the evolution under international
extradition law with regard to the concept of the political offense

exception.97
V.

THE POLITICAL, MILITARY, RELIGIOUS, AND RACIAL
ELEMENTS OF ARTICLE 3

A. The PoliticalElement
The decision to place the political element first among the four
elements of Article 3 was unlikely to have been a random one. Indeed,
this aspect has been the most prominent one in INTERPOL's practice,
notably as it is the primary element aimed at guaranteeing INTERPOL's

neutrality. 98
The application of the political element to address the other main
objectives of Article 3 is also frequent. First, for reflecting principles of
international extradition law, this element introduced the political
offense exception into INTERPOL's practice. Thus, INTERPOL has
consistently refused to facilitate cooperation where a request was based
on pure olitical charges (e.g., treason) or offenses limiting free political
speech.
Another example of the application of the political element is found
97. See Vienna Convention, supra note 25, art. 31(3), according to which for the purpose
of interpretation of a treaty, "[t]here shall be taken into account, together with the context: ...
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties." The
1994 Report stated that "for many years, the general trend of Interpol's practice, as well as of
developments in international law, has been to progressively restrict the application of
provisions which could ensure that those who commit certain crimes are treated more favorably
because of the political context of the act." 1994 Report, supra note 90. The narrowing of the
political offense exception has been manifested in a number of international instrumentsparticularly in the field of counter-terrorism. Cf International Convention for the Suppression of
the Financing of Terrorism, A/Res/54/109 (Dec. 09, 1999), art. 14, available at
European Convention on the
http://treaties.un.org/doc/dblTerrorismlenglish-18-11.pdf;
Suppression of Terrorism (Strasbourg, 27, 1977) art. 1. See also Revised Manuals on the Model
Treaty on Extradition and on the Model Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters,
published by the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime [hereinafter Revised Manuals],
42,
available at http://www.unodc.org/pdf/model treaty extradition revised manual.pdf: "[t]he
history of the political offen[s]e exception is an interesting study in the progression of efforts to
accommodate legitimate political change, while increasingly denying sanctuary to perpetrators
of violence."
98. See Statement to Reaffirm Independence & Political Neutrality, supra note 94.
99. See 1984 Application of Article 3 Resolution; 1994 Report, supra note 90.
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in cases related to an unconstitutional change of government.
INTERPOL's assistance may be requested in the following scenarios:
1) Requests against individuals related to the ousted government, for
example members of a government in exile, sought by the de facto
government following a coup d'etat; 2) requests against individuals
sought for their involvement in a failed coup; 3) requests against
individuals who belonged to the de facto government, once the original
government has been reinstated; and 4) requests sent by one country
against individuals involved in a coup d'etat in another country.
The involvement of INTERPOL in such cases may pose challenges
regarding compliance with Article 3, since crimes allegedly committed
in such situations frequently include political elements. Facilitating
cooperation might also lead to an undesired involvement of INTERPOL
in the domestic politics of the country concerned,100 or in the country's
international relationship with other countries. Accordingly,
INTERPOL has generally refrained from any involvement in cases
related to an unconstitutional seizure of power, unless there are
indications of violent acts or other elements that may tip the balance in
favor of the case having a predominantly ordinary law character.
An example of a case that fell under the first scenario described
above and where INTERPOL refused cooperation was a request sent by
the Honduran NCB in July 2009 to publish a red notice against Manuel
Zelaya, the ousted President of the country.' 0 The request was sent to
INTERPOL's General Secretariat only a few days following the coup
d'etat in the country, and sought the arrest of Zelaya based on charges
of misuse of authority; usurpation of public functions; offenses against
the system of government; and treason.102 These charges were assessed
by the Office of Legal Affairs of the General Secretariat as being of a
political nature with no ordinary law crime element. 103 In addition, the
fact that Honduran authorities turned away a plane carrying the ousted
President, which had intended to land in Tegucigalpa, the Honduran
capital, pointed to the existence of motives other than the promotion of
international police cooperation.104 The red notice request was therefore

100. See Bettina Schandorf-Haubold, The Administration of Information in International
Administrative Law-The Example of Interpol, 9 GERMAN L. REV. 1719, 1720 (2008). The
author mentioned Article 3 as one of INTERPOL's functional limitations and noted that "the
non-interference with national political matters is an important premise for the willingness of
member states to cooperate on a broad transnational level."
101. See INTERPOL, INTERPOL will not Issue Red Noticefor Arrest ofPresidentManuel
Zelaya (July 7, 2009), available at http://www.interpol.int/News-and-media/News-mediarelea
ses/2009/PRO65.
102. See id.
103. Id.
104. See id.
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denied by INTERPOL. 0 5
With regard to the protection of individuals' rights, the political
element may be particularly relevant when evaluating individuals'
claims that information processed via INTERPOL's channels is aimed
at persecuting them due to their political activities or opinions. Such
claims are examined by the Commission for the Control of
INTERPOL's Files [CCF], an independent body whose role is to ensure
that the processing of personal information by INTERPOL is in
compliance with the Organization's rules, including with Article 3.106
B. The Military Element
This element was not included in the original restriction on
INTERPOL's involvement in certain matters, as introduced in the
Organization's Statute in 1948,107 and was added only upon the
adoption of the 1956 Constitution. Incorporating this element in Article
3 enabled the Organization to reflect the international law principle that
excludes extradition for acts punishable only under military law. 8
In application of this principle, INTERPOL has consistently
refrained from facilitating cooperation in cases of pure military
offenses, such as desertion.109 At the same time, INTERPOL's
involvement is not excluded a priori where an ordinary law crime was
committed in a military context. For example, in a case where a soldier
murdered his colleague in a peace-time setting, the application of the
predominance test will probably lead to the conclusion that the case
falls outside the scope of Article 3. Based on the same reasoning,
cooperation is not hindered by the mere fact that the arrest warrant
105. Id.
106. See INTERPOL Constitution, supra note 1, art. 36. If the CCF finds that the
information provided by an individual indeed points to violation of Article 3, it will forward to
INTERPOL's General Secretariat this finding and its recommendations with regard to the
necessary actions to be taken to amend the situation. See INTERPOL General Secretariat, Rules
on the Control of Information and Access to Interpol's Files art. 6, available at
http://www.interpol.int/About-INTERPOL/Legal-materials/Data-protection.
For
further
information on the CCF, see http://www.interpol.int/About-INTERPOL/Structure-andgovernance/Commission-for-the-Control-of-INTERPOL's-Files; see also MARTHA, supra note
10, at 92-104; Cheah Wui Ling, PolicingInterpol: The Commissionfor the ControlofInterpol's
Files andthe Right to a Remedy, 7 INT'L ORG. L. REv. 375 (2010); Savino, supra note 96, at 58.
107. See supra note 18.
108. See Model Treaty on Extradition, A/Res/45/116, art. 3(c) (Dec. 14, 1990) (according
to which extradition shall not be granted "[i]f the offen[s]e for which extradition is requested is
an offen[s]e under military law, which is not also an offen[s]e under ordinary criminal law")
[hereinafter Model Treaty on Extradition]. The exclusion of military offences from extradition
has been recognized under customary international law. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 46, at 733.
109. See 1984 Application of Art. 3 Resolution, supra note 67; 1994 Report, supra
note 92.
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supporting a request to arrest a fugitive was issued by a military
tribunal. In such a case, if the assessment of the particular request points
to the matter being of a predominantly ordinary law nature, cooperation
should generally be permitted.'"0
A specific category of requests that may require consideration
concerns acts committed in an armed conflict or a military operation.
Such acts are likely to fall within the scope of Article 3 due to the
predominance of both the political and military elements. Nonetheless,
where the acts amount to serious international crimes, the application of
the 1994 Report and the Resolutions that followed will generally lead to
the conclusion that Article 3 would not prevent INTERPOL's
involvement.
The 1994 Report, however, presented a challenge with regard to the
interpretation of Article 3 upon assessing requests for cooperation
concerning serious international crimes: while permitting INTERPOL's
cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia [ICTY], and therefore enabling INTERPOL's involvement
in this field, the Report nevertheless rejuired the application of the
predominance test to assess each offense. 1 Moreover, upon analyzing
the various offenses enumerated by the ICTY Statute, the Report
concluded that the crime of compelling a prisoner of war or a civilian to
serve in the forces of a hostile power (Article 2(e) of the ICTY Statute)
may be considered as an "essentially military offen[s]e" that falls under
Article 3.112
The position presented by the 1994 Report and its underlying
rationale raise difficulties not only concerning this particular crime, but
also when evaluating other serious war crimes that are ostensibly of
"military" nature, such as illegal conscription of child soldiers or
unlawful use of certain weapons. The Report's position derives from the
traditional principles of an Article 3 analysis, namely the focus on an
examination of the elements of a crime. This approach, however,
requires reconsideration: as explained, Article 3 is aimed at, inter alia,
reflecting principles of international law. Accordingly, the assessment
of a particular offense in the context of Article 3 should consider the
background for criminalizing the act, as well as the stance of the
international community with regard to that offense.
Unlike pure military offences such as desertion, which are derived
110. The involvement of military tribunals in the criminal proceedings in the requesting
country may nonetheless require consideration in light of other INTERPOL's rules. For
example, decisions of military tribunals or "Security Courts" may require assessment of
conformity with the "spirit of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights." INTERPOL
Constitution, supra note 1, art. 2(1).
111. 1994 Report, supra note 90.
112. Id.
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solely from military law and are therefore considered as nonextraditable offences,'" 3 the criminalization under national law of
serious international crimes reflects international conventions such as
the 1948 Genocide Convention 1 l 4 and is frequently incorporated in the
domestic ordinary laws or similar penal legislation.' 15 Furthermore,
serious international crimes are considered extraditable offenses in light
of their heinous nature." 6 One cannot ignore the developments in
international law with regard to these offenses and the clear recognition
by the international community of the importance of bringing to justice
perpetrators of these crimes.
INTERPOL's practice in the years that followed the 1994 Report
manifests that the Organization endorsed the view that the entire
category of serious international crimes falls outside Article 3. Indeed,
INTERPOL has significantly increased its involvement in the field
without distinguishing between the various crimes.' 17
Notably, INTERPOL's General Assembly resolution approving the
cooperation agreement with the ICC clearly stated that the crimes that
come within the jurisdiction of the ICC fall outside Article 3."' By
adopting this resolution, the General Assembly acknowledged the
special status of serious international crimes, and in fact rejected,
although without discussion or explanation, the underlying reasoning of
the 1994 Report and its conclusion with regard to the crime of
compelling a prisoner of war or a civilian to serve in the forces of a
hostile power," 9 and possibly similar "military" crimes. The 2004
Resolution should be considered as a "subsequent agreement between
the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of

113. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 46, at 732-34.
114. The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.
115. See, e.g., U.S. War Crimes Act of 1996 (making specific reference to the international
conventions such as the Conventions signed at Geneva Aug. 12, 1949).
116. Indeed, the U.N. Model Treaty on Extradition excludes serious international crimes
from both the political offence and the military offence exceptions to extradition. See Revised
Manuals, supra note 97, Part I, IM 45, 49. Considering that one of the aims of Article 3 is to
reflect principles of international extradition law, for the purpose of interpretation of Article 3,
the principle that views serious international crimes as extraditable offences is among "the
relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties" in the meaning
of Article 31(3)(c) of the 1969 Vienna Convention. Vienna Convention, supra note 25, art.
31(3)(c). BASSIOUNI, supra note 46.
117. To learn about some of INTERPOL's activities in the field, see INTERPOL,
Genocide, War Crimes, and Crimes Against Humanity, http://www.interpol.int/Crimeareas/Fugitive-investigations/War-crimes (last visited Apr. 16, 2011).
118. Cooperation Agreement with the ICC, supra note 90.
119. This crime is listed in Article 8(2)(a)(v) of the Rome Statute of the ICC. Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court, ICC-ASP/2/Res.3 (July 17, 1998), art. 8(2)(a)(v)
[hereinafter Rome Statute], availableat http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/statute/romefra.htm.
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its provisions" within the meaning of the Vienna Convention.120
INTERPOL's cooperation with the ICC further supports the position
that, in practice, the approach of the 1994 Report was abandoned:
INTERPOL has published a number of red notices upon the request of
the ICC against individuals sought for crimes such as enlisting and
conscripting of children under the age of fifteen, a crime whose
elements could have been considered to be of "military" nature if the
rationale of the 1994 Report had been applied.12 1 The publication of
those red notices reflects a "subsequent practice in the application of the
treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its
interpretation" under the terms of the Vienna Convention.122
Hence, in application of general principles of interpretation of a
treaty, it can be claimed that the interpretative paradigm of the 1994
Report regarding the assessment of the nature of serious international
crimes is no longer applicable, and does not pose aprimafacieobstacle
for cooperation with requests concerning those crimes.
On a separate note, one should recall that Article 3 might apply
beyond the narrow ambit of the nature of the offense. In that reference,
requests concerning serious international crimes may be particularly
sensitive and may have political and other implications for the
relationship among INTERPOL member countries. Thus, for example,
countries may attempt to use INTERPOL's channels for political ends
under the disguise of prosecution of serious international crimes.
Requests of such nature will require a broader examination under
120. Vienna Convention, supra note 25, art. 31(3)(a).
121. For example, the red notices issued by INTERPOL in 2006 against the leaders of the
Lord Resistance Army [LRA] sought by the ICC for, inter alia, the crime of forced enlisting of
children. See Press Release, International Criminal Court, InterpolIssues FirstICC Red Notices
(Jan. 6, 2006), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/Go?id=9fe2c45a-91b3-414c-891c1590cl6296bb&lan=en-GB.
122. Vienna Convention, supra note 25, art. 31(3)(b). Subsequent practice is considered as
"a most important element in the interpretation of any treaty." See ANTHONY AuST, MODERN
TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 194 (2000). On the importance of practice for the purpose of
interpreting the rules governing the operation of an international organizations, see Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties Between States & International Organizations or Between
International Organizations, art. 2(j), March 21, 1986, A/CONF.129/15, which states that "'rules
of the organization' means, in particular, the constituent instruments, decisions, and resolutions
adopted in accordance with them, and established practice of the organization"; International
Law Commission, Report of the International Law Commission, delivered to the General
Assembly, art. 2, 1 16, U.N. Doc. A/64/10 (May to Aug., 2009), which is an explanatory note
according to which "one important feature of the definition of 'rules of organization' in
subparagraph (b) is that it gives considerable weight to practice"; and Reparation for Injuries
Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1949 I.C.J. 180 (Apr. 11,
1949), wherein the International Court of Justice indicated that "the rights and duties of an entity
such as the Organization must depend upon its purposes and functions as specified or implied in
its constituent documents and developed in practice."
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Article 3 based on the other elements provided in INTERPOL's rules.123
C. The Religious andRacial Elements
The prohibition against any intervention in cases of religious or
racial character corresponds to fundamental principles of international
human rights, notably the right to freedom of religionl24 and the
prohibition of racial discrimination.125 This position also reflects
international extradition law, which bars extradition where the requested
State has substantial grounds for believing that the request has been
made for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing a person on account
of, inter alia, that person's race or religion.126 INTERPOL's General
Assembly resolutions discuss a number of examples of pure religious
and racial offenses: practicing a prohibited religion, recruitment or
propaganda for particular religions, membership in a racial association,
and belonging to a banned religious group.127
Similar to the political and military elements, the existence of
religious and racial factors does not entail the immediate application of
Article 3. Indeed, restrictions prescribed by law on the freedom of
religion deemed "necessary to protect public safety, order, health or
morals of the fundamental rights and freedoms of others" 2 8 do not
contravene an individual's freedom of religion and will not be
considered as pure religious offenses. Thus, for example, the
criminalization of hate speech is not considered as a pure religious or
racial offense, and States are encouraged to criminalize such acts.129
With regard to the term "racial," the 1994 Report refers to a
distinction between "race" and "ethnic group," pointing to the wording
of the 1948 Genocide Convention, which expressly distinguished
between ethnic and racial groups.' 30 Notwithstanding this distinction in
the Genocide Convention, it seems that for the purpose of protecting
123. See infra Part VI.
124. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III) A, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948), art. 18. See also Declaration on the Elimination of all Forms of
Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, G.A. Res. 36/55, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/36/55 (Nov. 25, 1981) [hereinafter Declaration on Religious Tolerance].
125. Declaration on Religious Tolerance, supra note 124, art. 2; International Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, G.A. Res. 2106 (XX), Dec. 21, 1965,
660 U.N.T.S. 195 [hereinafter 1965 Convention on Racial Discrimination].
126. See Model Treaty on Extradition, supra note 108, art. 3(b).
127. 1984 Application of Article 3 Resolution, supra note 67; 1994 Report, supra note 90.
128. See Declaration on Religious Tolerance, supra note 124, art. 1(3).
129. See, e.g., 1965 Convention on Racial Discrimination, supra note 125, art. 4.
130. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, art. 2, Dec.
9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (defining genocide as certain acts committed with intent to destroy, in
whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such).
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individual rights a broader interpretation of the term "racial" is desired.
To that end, the more comprehensive definition of the term "racial
discrimination" in the 1965 Convention on Racial Discrimination
appears to be appropriate. This definition includes, inter alia,
discrimination based on "ethnic origin."'31
In the context of INTERPOL's work, questions concerning the
possible application of Article 3 due to religious and racial elements are
likely to arise in the following scenarios: first, with regard to pure
religious/racial offenses, such as membership in a forbidden religious
organization. Such cases undoubtedly fall within the scope of Article 3.
In the second possible scenario, religious/racial elements might exist
in the context of the crime committed. One example is the case of a
murder derived from religious motives. Similar to cases with political or
military elements, when the facts present both ordinary crime elements
and religious or racial elements, INTERPOL will apply the
predominance test, taking into account factors such as the seriousness of
the crime and whether it "constitute[s] a serious threat to personal
freedom, life[,] or property."1 32
A third scenario is where religious or racial elements exist in the
context of police operations. Thus, for example, operations based on
racial profiling, namely singling out a racial group for the purpose of
police activities without objective and reasonable justification, is likely
to violate both INTERPOL's rules (Articles 2(1) and 3 of the
Constitution), and possibly also national laws.13 3 At the same time,
reference to a person's race in a police form used for the identification
of victims after a natural disaster (such as a tsunami) does not, by itself,
contravene Article 3, as it is aimed at facilitating searches for missing
persons rather than stigmatizing individuals based on their race.
Finally, INTERPOL's rules dictate that personal information
revealing racial or ethnic origin is considered "particularly sensitive
information," 34 and the processing of such information is therefore
permitted only following the fulfillment of certain conditions.' 35
131. See 1965 Convention on Racial Discrimination, supra note 125, art. 1(1).
132. 1984 Application of Article 3 Resolution, supra note 67.
133. See, in that respect, the holding of the European Court of Human Rights [ECHR],
according to which "no difference in treatment which is based exclusively or to a decisive extent
on a person's ethnic origin is capable of being objectively justified in a contemporary
democratic society built on the principle of pluralism and respect for different cultures."
Timishev v. Russia, 58, Nos. 55762/00 & 55974/00, 2005 ECHR--XII (Dec. 13, 2005). The
use of such grounds as ethnic or national origin may be justified, however, for "very weighty
reasons." Gaygusuz v. Austria, $ 42, No. 17371/90 (May 23, 1996), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,ECHR,,TUR,,3ae6b6fl2c,0.html (i.e., the pursuance of
a legitimate aim, which outweighs the discriminatory character).
134. RPI, supra note 14, art. 1(d).
135. Id. art. 10.2; Implementing Rules, supra note 15, art. 10.
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Accordingly, cases falling under this category will require an analysis
that evaluates in particular the necessity and proportionality in
processing an item of information, as well as conditions put in place to
ensure the objectivity and non-discriminatory requirements, and the
terminology used.

VI. THE INTERPRETATION AND

IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE
THE SPHERE OF PROCESSING OF INFORMATION VIA

3 IN

INTERPOL's CHANNELS
A. The Legal Framework
Traditionally, INTERPOL's primary roles have included facilitating
the sharing of information regarding police matters among its member
INTERPOL's Constitution therefore provides that the
countries.
General Secretariat shall, inter alia, serve "as an international centre in
the fight against ordinary crime" and as "a technical and information
centre."'l37 To that end, INTERPOL has established communication
systems and created operational data services and databases.' 3 8 These
services include the publication of international notices upon the request
of member countries and international tribunals, and the registration of
"diffusions," namely messages exchanged among member countries, in
INTERPOL's criminal databases.1 39
INTERPOL has put in place an elaborate legal frameworkl40 aimed
at ensuring that the processing of information via the Organization's
channels comply with international standards, such as data protection
principles. The most pertinent rules for the purpose of Article 3
interpretation are the RPI and its Implementing Rules.
The RPI was meant to set out the conditions and basic procedures
according to which information may be processed by the Organization
or through its channels. 14 1 It explicitly mentions Article 3 in its
preamble,142 and, as mentioned above, in its definition of "ordinary law
crime." Most importantly, Article 3 is invoked-albeit implicitly-in
the process of examining the conditions governing the processing of
136. See INTERPOL, Overview, supra note 7.
137. INTERPOL Constitution, supra note 1, arts. 26(b), 26(c).
138. See INTERPOL, Priorities, supra note 12.
139. See Notices, supra note 14.
140. See Cheah Wui Ling, Mapping Interpol's Evolution: FunctionalExpansion and the
Move to Legalization, 4 Policing 28-37 (2010), available at http://policing.oxfordjoumals.org/
content/4/1/28.full.pdf+html.
141. Rules on the Processing of Information, supra note 14, art. 2(a).
142. "Considering Article 3 of the Organization's Constitution, which forbids it to
undertake any intervention or activities of a political, military, religious or racial character." Id.
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information. Article 10.1 of the RPI prescribes that:
(a) Processing of information through the Organization's
channels may only be carried out if all the following conditions
are met:
(1) It complies with the Constitution and relevant provisions in
the Organization's rules; ...
(5) It is carried out by its source in the context of the laws
existing in its country, in conformity with the international
conventions to which it is a party, and with the Organization's

Constitution.143
Thus, compliance with Article 3 is a condition for the Processing, via
INTERPOL's channels of a request for police cooperation, such as a
request to arrest an individual based on a national arrest warrant.
The Implementing Rules of the RPI, adopted for the purpose of
implementing the general principles set out in the RPI, include a
specific rule concerning Article 3. Article 40 of the Implementing Rules
reads:
(a) To determine whether a specific intervention or activity is of a
political, military, religious or racial character, all relevant
information shall be examined, including the following:
(i) the nature of the offen[s]e, namely the charges and the
underlying facts[;]
(ii) the status of the persons concerned[;]
(iii) the identity of the source of the information [;]
(iv) the position expressed by a Member or international
authorized entities other than the source of the information[;]
(v) the obligations under international law[;]
(vi) the implications on the neutrality of the Organization[; and]
(vii) the general context of the case.
(b) National Central Bureaus and international authorized entities
shall inform the General Secretariat as soon as possible when
there is any doubt about whether the processing of an item of
information complies with Article 3 of the Constitution.
(c) The General Secretariat shall develop a repository of practice
143. It appears that this repetition of the requirement that the processing of information
must comply with the Constitution is redundant.
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on the application of Article 3 of the Constitution, based on
directives issued by the General Assembly and pertinent elements
of international law, which shall be made available to National
Central Bureaus, national authorized institutions[,] and
authorized international entities.'"
This implementing rule refers to substantive as well as institutional
aspects of the interpretation of Article 3. The former are addressed in
Article 40(a), which enumerates-in a non-exhaustive listl 4 5-the
relevant types of information that require examination in the context of
an Article 3 analysis of a particular case. The latter are mentioned in
Article 40(b) and Article 40(c). 14 6
Article 40 therefore serves as a "subsequent agreement between the
parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the ap lication of its
provisions" under the terms of the Vienna Convention. It is the only
provision in INTERPOL's legal framework that specifically addresses
the interpretation of Article 3, and its elements therefore merit
discussion.
B. Article 40(a)-ExaminationofAll Relevant Information of a
ParticularCase
By referring to an examination of a "specific intervention or
activity," Article 40(a) corresponds to the directive embodied in
INTERPOL's General Assembly Resolutions, accordin to which each
request for cooperation requires a case-by-case analysis.
The drafters of this implementing rule chose not to define the four
elements of Article 3, namely the political, military, religious, and racial
elements; rather, the rule focuses on the types of information that
require consideration in the context of an Article 3 analysis.149 This
approach may have derived from the difficulty of formulating a
comprehensive definition of terms such as "political character." The
interpretation of those elements would thus continue to be based on the
jurisprudence developed by the Organization and its updates in the
context of the repository of practice foreseen in Article 40(c).1 50
The various factors listed in Article 40(a) can be divided into two
144. Implementing Rules, supra note 15, art. 40.
145. Id. at 40(a). The non-exhaustive nature of the list provided in Article 40(a) is evident
considering the phrasing of that Article: "all relevant information shall be examined, including
the following: . . ." Id. (emphasis added).
146. Id. art. 40(b)-(c).
147. Vienna Conventions, supra note 24, art. 31(3)(a).
148. Implementing Rules, supra note 14, art. 40(a).
149. See id.
150. See id art. 40(c).
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general categories: the first concerns information emanating directly
from the specific request for police cooperation, such as the nature of
the offense. The second category, which includes factors such as the
general context of the case, invokes the examination of pertinent facts
beyond those explicitly provided in the particular request. Yet, both
categories and the factors they contain are of equal importance: no
hierarchical structure exists among the different factors, and each of
them, by itself or in combination with others, can define the outcome of
an Article 3 analysis.
The need to evaluate "all relevant information" and the factors
enumerated in Article 40(a) represent a holistic interpretative paradigm,
which departs from the narrower test focusing solely on the examination
of the "nature of the offen[s]e," a test which dominated the
interpretation of Article 3 in the past.' 5 1 In doing so, Article 40(a) not
only epitomizes a modern and comprehensive approach, but also
addresses the various objectives of the prohibition embodied in Article
3. Most importantly, it enables the prevention of situations where
processing of requests ostensibly based on "ordinary law" crimes might
compromise the Organization's independence and neutrality, or serve
for purposes of political and other forms of persecution.
C. The Nature of the Offense
The nature of the offense remains an important criterion for an
Article 3 analysis. Hence, in accordance with INTERPOL's General
Assembly resolutions and long-standing practice, the Organization will
deny requests for police cooperation (e.g., requests to publish notices)
which concern offenses of pure political, military, religious or racial
nature, and will continue to evaluate offenses of mixed nature using the

predominance test.152
As indicated in Article 40(a)(i), the nature of the offense is
determined by both the charges and the underlying facts. 5 3 Assessing
the facts is imperative considering that the charges may be articulated
differently by different States, and may not necessarily reflect the true
nature of the offense. Thus, the charges cannot serve as the sole basis
151. This narrower approach can be found in the wording of General Assembly
Resolutions and Reports. The 1951 Resolution, for instance, refers to requests for provisional
arrest for offences of a predominantly political nature. See 1951 Resolution, supra note 55. The
1984 Application of Article 3 Resolution listed examples of offenses that, by their very nature,
fall under Article 3. See 1984 Application of Article 3 Resolution, supra note 67. The 1994
Report analyzed the compliance of the various offences listed in the ICTY Statute with Article
3. See 1994 Report, supra note 90.
152. See INTERPOL, INTERPOL Will Not Issue Red Notice for Arrest of President
Manuel Zelaya, supranote 101.
153. Implementing Rules, supra note 15, art. 40(a)(i).
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for concluding that a given request falls under Article 3. For example, a
fugitive may be sought for allegedly committing the crime of
"undermining State security," which a priori appears to be a political
crime. The underlying facts, however, may provide that the fugitive has
actively participated in a terrorist bombing that caused the death of
civilians. In such a case, it is likely that Article 3 would not prevent
police cooperation, the rationale being that the offense committed is of
predominantly ordinary law nature, due to the seriousness of the crime
and its consequences.
D. The Status of the Person Concernedand the Identity of the
Source of the Information
The element concerning the status of the person concerned calls for
the examination of pertinent facts related to the individual who is the
subject of the information processed. 154 The term "status" appears to
refer principally to the person's profession or role within certain groups
or associations. Thus, for example, the fact that a person against whom
a red notice has been requested is a politician, a military officer, or a
leader of a religious group may require consideration in the context of
an Article 3 analysis.
Concerns emanating from the person's "status" should be examined
in light of the facts of the case and the general context of the case. For
example, the mere fact that a person was the former president of the
requesting country should not automatically preclude the use of
INTERPOL's channels for the purpose of seeking her arrest. Indeed, if
Article 3 inevitably prevents INTERPOL's involvement in such a case,
this would provide for impunity of high officials whose "status" would
protect them, thereby frustrating INTERPOL's aim to promote
international police cooperation.
INTERPOL's General Assembly addressed the dilemma concerning
the person's status in two of its Resolutions on Article 3. The 1984
Application of Article 3 Resolution provided that:
Article 3 also covers any acts committed by politicians in
connection with their political activities, even if those concerned
are prosecuted after their fall from power and, in some cases,
after they have fled abroad. The situation is different in the case
of an offens]e committed by a politician acting as a private
individual. 15
For the purpose of Article 3, the resolution therefore invoked the
154. See id. art. 40(a)(ii)-(iii).
155. 1984 Application of Article 3 Resolution, supra note 67, art. 11.2.
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distinction between acts committed in "official capacity" and those
committed in "private capacity." This position posed a challenge ten
years later when the General Assembly was requested to approve
cooperation with the ICTY. As indicated in the 1994 Report, the
individual criminal responsibility imposed by the ICTY Statute refers to
crimes that are likely to be committed by politicians, and the test
prescribed by the 1984 Application of Article 3 Resolution could have
therefore entailed that Article 3 should apply and prevent cooperation

with the Tribunal. 156
Such a conclusion was clearly inconceivable in light of the object
and purpose of Article 3, and considering the international stance
toward ending impunity for perpetrators of serious international crimes,
as manifested by the creation of the ICTY. Hence, the 1994 Report
found that the part of the 1984 Resolution referring to acts committed
by politicians seemed to have been based on a faulty concept.' 57 It
concluded that the offenses referred to in the Tribunal's Statute cannot
have been committed in the exercise of political power; rather, they can
only have been committed outside of such power, and the offender
bears personal responsibility for them as the Statute states.
The 1994 Report held that offenses committed by politicians must
therefore be assessed to determine whether the political or the ordinary
criminal law aspect is predominant, in the same way as offenses
committed by other people.159 Similarly, with regard to military
personnel, the Report found that the fact that a person who committed a
crime is a member of the armed forces does not automatically make the
offense a military one, any more than an offense committed by a

156. See 1994 Report, supranote 90.
157. Id.
158. A similar conclusion-although based on different reasoning-was presented in the
Joint Separate Opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal of the ICJ, in the case
concerning the Arrest Warrant of Apr. 11, 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v.
Belgium), Judgment of Feb. 14, 2002 [Arrest Warrant Case], where the ICJ examined the nature
and the scope of immunity accorded to Heads of States and Ministers of Foreign Affairs. The
three judges mentioned that
It is now increasingly claimed in the literature . . . that serious international
crimes cannot be regarded as official acts because they are neither normal State
functions nor functions that a State alone (in contrast to an individual) can
perform ... This view is underscored by the increasing realization that Staterelated motives are not the proper test for determining what constitutes public
state acts.
Arrest Warrant of 11 Apr. 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3, 88 1 85
(Feb. 14, 2002) (joint separate opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans, Buergenthal).
159. 1994 Report, supra note 90.
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politician automatically becomes a political offense.160
In practice, one can draw a general distinction between three types of
requests for police cooperation: first, with regard to individuals wanted
by their own countries; secondly, with regard to individuals wanted by
other countries; and thirdly, with regard to individuals sought by
international tribunals. These scenarios therefore invoke not only an
examination of the status of the person concerned, but frequently that of
the identity of the source of information as well.
In the first scenario, and in application of the rationale of the 1994
Report, the status of the person may require evaluation in a manner
similar to. other requests, while taking into account the possible
difficulties arising in the particular case. For example, requests against
former politicians sought by their countries may raise concerns of
possible political persecution, which will be assessed in view of the
predominance test.
In the second scenario, the complexities raised in the context of an
Article 3 analysis might be of a different nature, particularly where
processing the request relates to an act of state or has implications for
inter-state relationships, and therefore possibly to INTERPOL's
neutrality. One example was the request sent by the Ecuadorian NCB in
July 2009, seeking the publication of a blue notice'61 for the purpose of
locating Colombia's former Minister of Defense Juan Manuel Santos
Calderon. After examining the facts provided and the basis for the blue
notice request, the Office of Legal Affairs of the General Secretariat
found the case to be of predominantly military and political nature. 162In
particular, Ecuador's request concerned acts allegedly committed in
Santos' official capacity as Colombia's Minister of Defense.' 63 It was
determined that "the alleged orders were given by him to a military
force carrying out a military operation in the territory of another
countr , hence manifesting both the political and military aspects of the
case.
Another pertinent example in the context of the second scenario is
where the individual enjoys immunity under international law, as, for
example, the Head of State or the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Based on
160. Id.
161. INTERPOL, INTERPOL Rules Prohibit Publication of Blue Notice for Former
Colombian Minister of Defen[s]e (July 10, 2009), available at http://www.interpol.int/Newsand-media/News-media-releases/2009/PRO69. In accordance with Article 37(a)(2)(i) of the
Implementing Rules of the Rules on the Processing of Information, Blue Notices may be
published in order to: "obtain information on a person of interest in a criminal investigation,
and/or [to] locate a person of interest in a criminal investigation, and/or [to] identify a person of
interest in a criminal investigation." Implementing Rules, supra note 15, art. 32(a)(2)(i).
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
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the well-recognized principle of immunity, information may not be
processed via INTERPOL's channels in such a case.16 5 Thus, for
example, following the 2005 election of Yulia Timoshenko as the Prime
Minister of Ukraine, who was wanted at the time by Russia and against
whom a red notice was published upon the request of NCB Moscow,
INTERPOL suspended the red notice and all information contained in
its databases concerning her, due the immunity she enjoyed under
international law.' 66
The cases described above in the second scenario may pose a
difficulty with regard to the application of the official/private capacity
test: as indicated, this test, introduced by the 1984 Application of
Article 3 Resolution, was later rejected by the 1994 Report. In the
Santos Calderon case, however, the conclusion reached by the Office of
Legal Affairs was based, inter alia, on the fact that the acts attributed to
him were conducted in his official capacity. 167 Similarly, where
immunity of state officials is concerned, an application of the
official/private test may be required to determine whether immunity
applies in the particular case. 6 The challenge is therefore how to
reconcile the position of the 1994 Report with those cases where the
"official capacity test" is invoked.
It appears that the stance of the 1994 Report was narrowly tailored to
ensure that requests from the ICTY against high level officials are not
blocked pursuant to the 1984 Application of Article 3 Resolution, as
this would have prevented cooperation in cases that involve prosecuting
perpetrators of serious international crimes. To that end, the Report
created a legal theory according to which serious international crimes
cannot be considered as acts committed in an official capacity. The
1994 Report did not, however, intend to reject altogether the "official
capacity test," which, in the context of an Article 3 analysis, may still
impact the outcome of the case: if the illegal conducts are allegedly
carried out in the official capacity of the individual concerned, they may
be perceived as acts of state and lead to an inter-state dispute or
165. See Arrest Warrant of 11 Apr. 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3, 88,
84 (Feb. 14, 2002) (holding that the mere issuance of the arrest warrant by Belgium authorities
violated the immunity accorded to the Congo's incumbent Minister for Foreign Affairs). The
ICJ mentioned that Belgium also requested the publication of a Red Notice in this case, but the
Notice was not issued. Id. at 11, 20.
166. See National Radio Company of Ukraine, All Data, Concerning Yulia Tymoshenko's
Search, Withdrawn from Interpol System (Apr. 13, 2005), available at http://www.nrcu.gov.ua/
index.php?id=148&listid=12985.
167. INTERPOL, INTERPOL Rules Prohibit Publication of Blue Notice for Former
ColumbianMinister ofDefen[s]e, supra note 161.
168. The ICJ held that a former Head of State or a former Minister of Foreign Affairs will
not enjoy immunity with regard to acts committed while in office in their private capacity.
Arrest WarrantCase, 2002 I.C.J. at 25,161.
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otherwise yield international ramifications. 6 9 Hence, upon assessing
compliance with Article 3, the official/private capacity test may be
invoked where the request concerns individuals of another country
whose alleged crimes were committed while in office and in their
official capacity. 7 0
With regard to the third scenario, namely requests originating from
international tribunals, the position of the person concerned will
generally have lesser weight in assessing the request. This derives from
the unique status of those tribunals established by the United Nations
Security Council (UNSC) via a Resolution adopted under Chapter VII
of the U.N. Charter,' 7 1 or tribunals acting in a particular case upon the
referral of the UNSCl72 a request sent by those tribunals represents the
stance of the international community and hence circulating it via
INTERPOL's channels through, for example, the publication of a
notice, is less likely to compromise INTERPOL's political neutrality or
raise other doubts with regard to the application of Article 3. In
addition, the principle of immunity under international law will not be
applied with regard to such requests. 7 3
In conclusion, the element concerning "the status of the person
concerned" remains important for the purposes of an Article 3 analysis,
169. The conduct of an organ of a state, if attributed to the state, might also entail
responsibility of the state under international law. See Draft Articles on Responsibility of States
for Internationally Wrongful Acts with Commentaries, 2001 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 31, at 40,
art. 4 [hereinafter Draft Articles].
170. This explains the reference made in the Article 3 analysis of the Santos Calderon case
to the fact that Ecuador's request concerned acts allegedly committed in his official capacity as
Colombia's Minister of Defense.
171. The ICTY was established by UNSC Resolution 827 (1993). S.C. Res. 827, 2, U.N.
Doc. S[RES/827 (May 25, 1993). The ICTR was established by U.N.S.C. Res. 955, 1 1, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994). For further discussion, see generally Paul J. Magnarella,
Expanding the Frontiers of Humanitarian Law: The International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda, 9 FLA. J. INT'L L. 421 (1994); Paul J. Magnarella, Some Milestones and Achievements
are the InternationalCriminal Tribunalfor Rwanda: The 1998 Kambanda and Akayesu Cases,
11 FLA. J. INT'L L. 517 (1997).
172. In accordance with Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court, the Court may exercise its jurisdiction upon the referral of the UNSC. See Rome Statute,
supra note 119, art. 13(b).
173. See Arrest Warrant Case, 2002 I.C.J. at 25, 61 (the Court mentioning that one of
the exceptions for the principle of immunity is cases where the individual is subject to criminal
proceedings before certain international criminal courts, where they have jurisdiction. The Court
mentioned the ICTY, ICTR, and ICC as examples. The statutes of those international tribunals
explicitly exclude a defense based on the individual's immunity or official position). Cf,
Updated Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (July 2009),
art. 7(2), available at http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Statute/statute_sept09 en.
pdf: ("[t]he official position of any accused person, whether as Head of State or Government or
as a responsible Government official, shall not relieve such person of criminal responsibility nor
mitigate punishment").
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as it may both trigger the analysis and determine its outcome. The
scenarios described above indicate that often the assessment of this
element will be conducted in conjunction with the element involving the
"the identity of the source of information."1 74
E. The PositionExpressedby a Member or InternationalAuthorized
Entities Other Than the Source of the Information
Information provided by entities other than the requesting country
may shed new light on a case from operational, legal, and even policy
perspectives.175 By referring to "the position expressed" and by limiting
the type of entities that express the position to "a Member or
international authorized entities,"1 76 this element of Article 40(a)
appears to focus on situations where the additional input is provided in
the context of disputes over the processing of information.
INTERPOL's rules provide for a procedure for the settlement of
disputes over the processing of information.' 7 7 This procedure is not
aimed at settling intergovernmental disputes, as this would be beyond
INTERPOL's mandate. In addition, the scope of the dispute is confined
to the question of conformity of the processing of a particular item of
information with INTERPOL's rules. Nonetheless, disputes that erupt
between NCBs over the processing of information-the publication of
red notices, for example-may be de facto disputes between the
respective countries and governments.' 7 8 Such disputes will likely
possess political and policy elements that require consideration within
174. Implementing Rules, supra note 15, art. 40(a)(3).
175. Hence the obligation requiring the users of INTERPOL's network to inform the
General Secretariat of any doubt about whether the processing of an item of information
complies with Article 3. See Implementing Rules, supra note 15, art. 40(b).
176. The Rules for Processing Information defines an international authorized entity as
"any entity, as referred to in Article 41 of the Constitution, which has concluded an agreement
with the Organization authorizing it to process information directly through the Organization's
channels." Rules on the Processing of Information, supra note 14, art. 1(g).
177. Id. art. 24, which reads:
Disputes that arise between National Central Bureaus, authorized national
institutions, authorized international entities, or between one of these entities
and the General Secretariat in connection with the application of the present
Rules and the implementing rules to which they refer, should be solved by
concerted consultation. If this fails, the matter may be submitted to the
Executive Committee and, if necessary, to the General Assembly in conformity
with the procedure to be established.
Id.
178. See MARTHA, supra note 10, at 63 (stating that "[tihe careful drafting of Article 24
notwithstanding, it cannot mask the fact that disputes between NCBs are, ultimately, disputes
between governments").
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the context of Article 3. Accordingly, INTERPOL's organs will need to
evaluate the substantive allegations raised by the protesting country to
decide whether they justify the application of Article 3 in the particular
case.
One example for the application of Article 40(a)(iv) is a case where
the processing of information involves a former Head of State of
another country who is wanted for acts allegedly committed while in
office. If no protest is made by that other country, the processing of
information may a priori take place. It can be assumed that the
individual's country either waived the individual's immunity, or does
not consider that the acts were committed in an official capacity where
immunity would persist. 179 If, however, a protest is submitted, this
would manifest that the case has evolved into a political interstate
dispute between two members, and the continuous processing of
information will likely be considered as violating Article 3, and possibly
the principle of immunity.
F. Obligations Under InternationalLaw
The requirement that processing of information via INTERPOL's
channels be conducted in accordance with obligations under
international law is evident. Moreover, it is explicitly referred to in the
RPI, which prescribes that the processing of an item of information
conformity with the international
must be carried out by the source "in
80
conventions to which it is a party."'
Nonetheless, the inclusion of this element in Article 40 is not
redundant. Consider the following example: an INTERPOL member
country requests the publication of a red notice against a person wanted
for "exporting commodities without a licence." The criminalization of
such an act may be for the purpose of implementing an embargo
imposed by the requesting country vis-6-vis another country for political
reasons. Such a request may therefore raise concerns with regard to
Article 3.
The charge mentioned above, however, may have a different
background and goals: for example, it may aim to implement sanctions
imposed on a particular State by the UNSC acting under Chapter VII of
the U.N. Charter.' 8 1 Alternatively, its objective may be to apply a
general prohibition imposed by the UNSC on the trade of certain
commodities, for instance with regard to products that may be used by
non-State actors to manufacture nuclear, chemical, or biological
179. See Arrest Warrant of 11 Apr. 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3, 25,
61 (Feb. 14, 2002).
180. Rules on the Processing of Information, supra note 14, art. 10.1(a)(5).
181. See U.N. Charter arts. 39, 41.
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weapons. 182 In both cases, the prohibition imposed by the UNSC on
exporting commodities-either to a particular State or to non-State
actors-represents the stance of the international community, and all
States have an obligation under international law to implement it.183
Consequently, upon examining the facts of the red notice request and
the background for criminalizing the particular act, the outcome of the
Article 3 analysis may differ in the scenarios described above: in the
first scenario (implementation of a bilateral embargo), the predominant
political nature of the case will likely lead to a conclusion that the case
falls under Article 3. In the latter scenario (implementation of sanctions
or prohibitions imposed by the UNSC), the probable conclusion would
be that Article 3 does not hinder the publication of the red notice. The
difference between the outcome in the two scenarios is the result of
consideration of the element listed in Article 40(a)(v), namely the
"obligations under international law."l 84
G. The Implications on the Neutrality of the Organization
To ensure the independence and neutrality of the Organization,
INTERPOL must refrain from engaging in activities that might
compromise its unique position as an international organization
focusing on enhancing international police cooperation.
The risk for the politicization of INTERPOL may sometimes be
addressed through other elements enumerated in Article 40(a). The
explicit reference to the implications for the neutrality of the
Organization is nonetheless imperative for ensuring that INTERPOL
takes into account policy considerations relevant to the specific case, as
well as in the broader context of the Organization's work. Indeed,
weighing in policy considerations such as possible implications to
INTERPOL's image and interests is mandated by the rules governing
the processing of information via INTERPOL's channels, s and is
182. Cf S.C. Res. 1540, 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1540 (Apr. 28, 2004) (concerning nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, where the UNSC decided that "all States, in
accordance with their national procedures, shall adopt and enforce appropriate effective laws
which prohibit any non-State actor to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer
or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery. . .").
183. See U.N. Charter art. 25, and, specifically with regard to sanctions, see U.N. Charter
art. 41.
184. See Implementing Rules, supra note 15, art. 40(a)(v).
185. One of the general conditions for processing an item of information is that the
processing "is not such that it might prejudice the Organization's aims, image or interests."
Rules on the Processing of Information, supra note 14, art. 10.1(a)(4). Reference to the
Organization's image or interests and to other policy considerations such as with regard to
"prejudicing international police cooperation" is made in other provisions of the RPI. Cf Id. at
arts. 10.3(b) & 15.2(b). Assessing policy considerations is also an integral part of the process of
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clearly of particular importance where the Organization's political
neutrality may be at stake.
In addition, Article 40(a)(vi) guarantees that INTERPOL's neutrality
is considered where other factors mentioned in Article 40(a) are less
applicable.186 An example of such a scenario is where INTERPOL's
involvement is requested in a case that has become the subject of an
international dispute between States, and political and legal negotiations
between the countries concerned are taking place outside of
INTERPOL's channels.187 An intervention by INTERPOL-for
example, via the publication of notices-may derail the negotiations
process or negatively affect their outcome, and may also sway
INTERPOL from police work into political debates on the international
level.
The "Rainbow Warrior" case presents a good example of the
implementation of policy considerations and the application of Article
3: in 1985, an undercover operation conducted by the French security
service in New Zealand led to the sinking of the Greenpeace ship
Rainbow Warrior and the death of one person. 88 Two French agents
were captured, tried, and sentenced in New Zealand.189 The NCB of
New Zealand sought INTERPOL's assistance in circulating requests
against a number of other French individuals accused of crimes, such as
murder and arson.190
Strictly speaking, the acts perpetrated by the accused individuals
were criminal acts, and the fact that they were committed with political
ends would not have precluded them from being considered "ordinary
law" crimes. Accordingly, INTERPOL's General Secretariat
disseminated the requests of New Zealand to the relevant member
countries during the initial stages of the investigation.191
When the political and military aspects of the whole operation
became clear, however, INTERPOL reconsidered its continued
involvement in the case, and decided that Article 3 barred further

publishing notices: In addition to ensuring compliance with all the general conditions for
processing of information, the General Secretariat is required to assess whether it would be
"necessary and advisable" to publish and circulate a notice. Id. art. 10.5(b).
186. Implementing Rules, supra note 15, art. 40(a)(vi).
187. If the dispute is brought before INTERPOL's organs, it is likely that Article 40(a)(iv)
will be applicable.
188. Rainbow Warrior (New Zealand v. France), France-New Zealand Arbitration
Tribunal 1 (Apr. 30, 1990), available at http://www.iilj.org/courses/documents/Rainbow
Warrior.pdf.
189. Id.
190. The description of the Rainbow Warrior case is based on an internal legal
memorandum (on file with author).
191. Id
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intervention.192 It was concluded that Article 3 cannot be applied to any
factual situation from a strictly legal perspective alone; rather, extralegal considerations may be relevant, and, moreover, may transform the
character of the case from an essentially criminal matter to a
predominantly political one. 193
To reach this conclusion, INTERPOL's General Secretariat took into
account the express recognition by the French authorities of their
involvement in this case; the publicity given to the case in the
international press and media; the political consequences involving
probable Ministerial responsibility; the negotiations that took place
between France and New Zealand; and the arbitration chaired by the
Secretary General of the United Nations at the time.194 Thus, despite the
existence of clear common law aspects in this case, the risk to the
neutrality of the Organization as well as facts attesting to the general
political context of the case,s were decisive in the assessment of the
case and in the conclusion that it fell under Article 3.196
H. The GeneralContext of the Case
The last element enumerated in Article 40(a) ensures that no relevant
factors will be overlooked upon conducting an Article 3 analysis. 197
This element enables a final two-tier evaluation: first, of facts related to
the specific case, which were not necessarily addressed via other
elements under Article 40(a); and secondly, of facts originating outside
the narrow realm of the particular request, which may nonetheless shed
important light on the background of the case and its overall context.
An example for the application of this element is where a red notice
request appears to comply with all the conditions mandated by
INTERPOL's rules. Nonetheless, comparing the particular request with
other requests may yield a different conclusion: it may be the case that
similar requests from the same country have been denied, since they
were considered as attempts to persecute political opposition leaders
under a disguise of "ordinary law crimes," such as corruption or fraud.
The new request examined by INTERPOL may therefore be part of a
pattern of an attempted abuse of INTERPOL's channels. In this
scenario, it is only the final level of assessment, namely the
consideration of the general context and relevant information beyond
the facts of the particular request, which may tilt the balance towards
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See discussion below concerning the element of the general context of the case.
Supra note 195.
Implementing Rules, supra note 15, art. 40(a)(vii).
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the denial of publication in application of Article 3.
I. Articles 40(b) and 40(c)-The Role of Users and the
GeneralSecretariat
Review of information processed via INTERPOL's channels in
application of Article 3 is incumbent upon INTERPOL's General
Secretariat, as the body in charge of ensuring compliance with
INTERPOL's rules on the processing of information.' 98 The General
Secretariat therefore conducts such review-for example of red notice
requests prior to their publication-on a regular basis.
The review might be triggered, however, by the users of
INTERPOL's network. Article 40(b) prescribes that the NCBs and the
international authorized entities (such as international tribunals) have
the duty to inform the General Secretariat where a doubt arises
regarding the compliance of a particular item of information with
Article 3.199 This provision aims at ensuring the active participation of
the network's users in guaranteeing the observance of the restrictions
imposed by Article 3. This is particularly important where information
is processed directly between users (e.g., between two NCBs) without
the involvement of the General Secretariat: by raising a doubt regarding
compliance with Article 3, the user, which received the questionable
request for police cooperation, enables the General Secretariat to
monitor the processing of information and intervene where necessary.
From this user's perspective, informing on the possible doubt also
reduces the risk that it will be held responsible for collaborating with a
request that does not comply with INTERPOL's rules and international
principles.2 0 0
Article 40(c) further requires the General Secretariat to develop a
repository of practice concerning the interpretation of Article 3.201 The
repository should be based on two sources: first, the "directives issued
by the General Assembly," namely the relevant Resolutions; and
198. Rules on the Processing of Information, supra note 14, art. 4.1.
199. See Implementing Rules, supra note 15, art. 40(b).
200. See, in that respect, Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 169, art. 16.
This states that:
A state which aids or assists another State in the commission of an
internationally wrongful act by the latter is internationally responsible for doing
so if: (a) that State does so with knowledge of the circumstances of the
internationally wrongful act; and (b) the act would be internationally wrongful
if committed by that State.
Id.
201.

Implementing Rules, supra note 15, art. 40(c).
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secondly, "pertinent elements of international law."2 02 The explicit
reference to these two sources manifests the operation of INTERPOL as
a classical international organization, whose activities are governed by
both the instructions adopted by its supreme organ and those derived
from international law. Moreover, it enables a continued dynamic
interpretation of Article 3 in accordance with developments within the
Organization and under international law.
J. Conclusion:Article 3 in the Context of Processingof Information
Article 3 remains of paramount importance in the field of processing
of information. Indeed, the relevant General Assembly resolutions
described in this Article, while not explicitly limiting their scope to
processing of information, in fact focus on the interpretation and
implementation of Article 3 in that area.2 03
The interpretation of Article 3 in this field has seen significant
changes throughout the years. In particular, the following two
developments are noteworthy: first, and on the one hand, the narrowing
of the scope of Article 3 with reference to the test concerning the nature
of the crime. Thus, for example, Article 3 no longer prevents the
processing of information related to crimes such as terrorism. This
development reflects the international community's stance towards the
perpetrators of such crimes, as indicated through limiting the
application of the political offense exception in extradition law.
Secondly, and on the other hand, the broadening of the examination of a
particular case in light of Article 3 to include other elements and
address other concerns, notably the need to ensure INTERPOL's
independence and neutrality.
In conclusion, and considering the principles and the developments
discussed, it appears that in the domain of processing of information
Article 3 should be construed as if it read as follows: "It is strictly
forbidden to use INTERPOL's channels for the purpose of processing
information of predominantly political, military, religious, or racial
character."

202. Id.
203. Cf INTERPOL, Request for International Enquiries, G.A. Res. AGN/20/RES/14
(June 11-15, 1951).
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VII. THE INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE 3 IN
THE CONTEXT OF COOPERATION WITH OTHER
INTERNATIONAL ENTITIES

A. The Applicable Test: The Purposeand Nature of the
PotentialCooperation
Successful international police cooperation undoubtedly requires
collaboration among international and regional organizations. This has
been recognized by the drafters of INTERPOL's Constitution, who
sought to enable such cooperation by providing that "[w]henever it
deems fit, having regard to the aims and objects provided in the
Constitution, the Organization shall establish relations and collaborate
with other intergovernmental or non-governmental international
organizations."20 4
Article 3, however, may pose an obstacle for the establishment of
working relations with certain organizations, whose mandates and
functions include the promotion of political, military, religious, or racial
objectives. A strict and literal reading of Article 3 may lead to a
conclusion that INTERPOL is necessarily forbidden to cooperate with
such organizations.
Nonetheless, such a stringent interpretation of Article 3 does not
represent "the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of
[INTERPOL's Constitution] in their context and in the light of its object
and purpose." 20 5 Indeed, it has been accepted that the natural and
ordinary meaning must be given to words in the context in which they
occur and not in the abstract, and that the text should not be interpreted
in a narrow and quasi-literal manner. 206
Accordingly, the reference to the words "political or military
character" in INTERPOL's Constitution does not entail that any
cooperation with another international body, whose decisions are guided
by political realities or may address military activities, is forbidden. If
such an interpretation applied, INTERPOL would have been prevented
from cooperating with a significant number of international
organizations, and, moreover, would not have been allowed to
undertake any activity connected to international instruments adopted
under the auspices of those organizations. Clearly, this was not the
intention of the drafters of INTERPOL's Constitution, and it does not
represent the modem international order that is based, inter alia, on an
increasing number of entities operating in the international sphere.
204. INTERPOL Constitution, supra note 1, at. art. 41.
205. Vienna Convention, supra note 25, art. 31(1).
206. C.F. AMERASHINGHE, PRINCIPLES OF THE INSTITUTIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS 44 (Cambridge U. Press 2005)
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The approach that has therefore guided INTERPOL in this area is to
evaluate potential interactions with other entities based on the purpose
and nature of the cooperation foreseen. Thus, if it is assessed that the
purpose of the anticipated joint activities with a particular organization
is to enhance international police cooperation, and that those activities,
by their very nature would not negatively affect INTERPOL's
independence and neutrality, and would not promote-directly or
indirectly-objectives of political, military, religious, or racial
character, then a priorithere is no hindrance to such collaboration.
This functional interpretation has guided the Organization since the
introduction of Article 41 in the 1956 Constitution, 0 and enabled it to
broaden its realm of activities and significantly increase its operations
on the international level through collaboration with other international
organizations. The following three examples manifest the application of
the "purpose and nature of cooperation" test in INTERPOL's practice.
B. Cooperationwith the U.N. Security Council Sanctions Committees
The UNSC is one of the principal organs of the United Nations, 208
and it was conferred with the primary responsibility for the maintenance
of international peace and security in accordance with the specific
powers it was granted by the U.N. Charter. 209
The key function of the UNSC has been to ensure the absence of the
use of force between States. 210 Nonetheless, the UNSC's role was
gradually developed to address other challenges. It has been correctly
stated that "[t]hreats to international peace and security now come as
much from a breakdown of law and order within states as from military
aggression by one state against another." 211
UNSC's practice indeed shows that "threat to the peace" is a
constantly evolving concept, which has been considerably broadened
207. As indicated by the drafters of the 1956 Constitution in their comment to draft Article
41 of the Constitution,
This article is included so that the Organization may accept tasks such as those
entrusted to it by the United Nations in the field of illicit drug trafficking . . . it
matters little what body entrusts the tasks, so long as it is not contrary to the
purpose and is within the competence of the Organization.
General Assembly of 1956 (on file with author).
208. U.N. Charter art. 7(1).
209. Id. at arts. 24(1), 24(2).
210. See U.N. Security Council, Background, http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc
background.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2011).
211. Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Policing InternationalPeace and Security: InternationalPolice
Forces, 17 Wis. INT'L L.J. 281, 282 (1999).
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since the beginning of the 1990s. 2 12 Specifically, the UNSC has
addressed criminal activities such as terrorism and serious international
crimes in a significant number of its resolutions. 21 The UNSC's
involvement in these areas has included acts directly falling within the
realm of international criminal law and justice, such as requiring
specific states to cooperate with criminal investigations and criminal
legal proceedings,2 1 4 establishing international criminal tribunals such
as the ICTY and ICTR, and listing individuals on terrorist watch lists
that subject those individuals to sanctions.2 1 5
Thus, UNSC's involvement in the fight against various criminal
activities is expanding, and this body explicitly recognized the existence
of links between international security and international crimes
including terrorism, money-laundering, and trafficking in illicit drugs
and illegal arms. 2 16 A typical recent example of the UNSC's intensive
involvement in combating international crime is found in its resolutions
regarding maritime piracy off the Coast of Somalia, a criminal activity
that has evolved into a major threat to international peace and
security.2 17
The mandates of UNSC and INTERPOL therefore entail that
cooperation between both organizations in the field of international
criminal law is possible-indeed essential. Yet, such cooperation
requires consideration of Article 3, since UNSC's decisions are
influenced by political realities, 2 18 and may also include "military
characteristics," such as the ordering of military operations.
212. See Stefan Talmon, The Security Council as World Legislature, 99 AM. J. INT'L L.
175, 180 (2005).
213. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001).
214. See the UNSC involvement in the Lockerbie case through S.C. Res. 731, U.N. Doc.
S/Res/731 (1992), availableat http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NRO/0 10/
90/IMG/NR001090.pdfOpenElement, S.C. Res. 748, U.N. Doc. S/Res/748 (1992), availableat
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/SOLUTION/GEN/NRO/01 1/07/IMG/NRO1 107.pdf7OpenEle
ment, and S.C. Res. 883, U.N. Doc. S/Res/883 (1993), available at http://daccess-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N93/626/78/PDF/N9362678.pdf?OpenElement.
215. See S.C. Res. 1267, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1267 (Oct. 15, 1999).
216. See S.C. Res. 1817, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1817 (June 11, 2008) (concerning the situation
in Afghanistan).
217. Since 2008, the UNSC adopted a significant number of Resolutions under Chapter
VII of the U.N. Charter with regard to the threats posed by maritime piracy off the coast of
Somalia. See S.C. Res. 1816, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1816 (June 2, 2008); S.C. Res. 1846, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1846 (Dec. 2, 2008); S.C. Res. 1851, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1851 (Dec. 16, 2008); S.C. Res.
1897, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1897 (Nov. 30, 2009); S.C. Res. 1918, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1918 (Apr. 27,
2010); S.C. Res. 1950, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1950 (Nov. 23, 2010; S.C. Res. 1976, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/I 976 (Apr. 11, 2011). See also below for further discussion on maritime piracy.
218. See Peter Rackow & Ignaz Stegmiller, Court of First Instance: EC Regulations:
"Targeted Sanctions," 71 J. CRIM. L., 25, 27 (2007) ("[d]ecisions of the Security Council under
Chapter VII UN Charter are essentially of a political nature"). Similarly, Talmon, supra note
212, at 180, stated that "[t]he determination of a threat to the peace thus requires more than mere
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If Article 3 were to block cooperation between the organizations,
this would lead to unreasonable results because it prevents INTERPOL
from effectively carrying out its functions in promoting international
police cooperation in fields such as counter-terrorism. Similarly, while
INTERPOL may certainly not participate in military activities carried
out by one or more of its member countries, INTERPOL is not
prevented from providing assistance to the international body in charge
of preventing armed conflicts and representing the stance of the
international community, so long as such collaboration is related to
police work. It is therefore the purpose and nature of the potential areas
of cooperation that determine the outcome of an Article 3 examination
with regard to possible cooperation with the UNSC.
In application of this principle, INTERPOL and the UNSC have
increased their cooperation since the conclusion of a formal cooperation
agreement between the United Nations and INTERPOL in 1997.219
Specifically, in Resolution 1617 of July 2005, the UNSC, for the first
time, made an explicit reference to collaboration with INTERPOL in the
fight against Al-Qaida and the Taliban. 22 0 Following that resolution,
INTERPOL's General Assembly adopted in September 2005 its own
resolution concerning the request of the UNSC that INTERPOL assist
in the U.N. fight against terrorism. 22 1 These two resolutions paved the
way for collaboration between INTERPOL and the UNSC sanctions
committee, established pursuant to UNSC Resolution 1267, and led to
the creation of a new type of notice, namely the INTERPOL-U.N.
Security Council Special Notice. 2 22
normative considerations; it also necessitates an analysis of political realities."
219. See INTERPOL, Cooperation Agreement Between the United Nations and the
International Criminal Police Organization-INTERPOL, available at http://www.interpol.intl
About-INTERPOL/Legal-materials/International-Cooperation-Agreements.
220. In this resolution, adopted under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, the Security
Council encouraged "Member States to work in the framework of Interpol, in particular through
the use of the Interpol database of stolen and lost travel documents, to reinforce the
implementation of the measures against Al-Qaida, Usama bin Laden, and the Taliban, and their
associates." It further requested the Secretary-General of the United Nations to take the
necessary steps to increase cooperation between the United Nations and Interpol in order to
provide the Committee with better tools to fulfill its mandate more effectively and to give
Member States better tools to implement the measures referred to in the Resolution. It also
urged all Member States, in their implementation of those measures, to ensure that stolen and
lost passports and other travel documents are invalidated as soon as possible and share
information on those documents with other Member States through the Interpol database. S.C.
Res. 1617, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1617 (2005) (July 29, 2005).
221. INTERPOL, The U.N. Security Council's Request to Interpol to Assist the UN's
Anti-Terrorism Fight, AG-2005-RES-05 (Sept. 19-22, 2005) (on file with author).
222. An INTERPOL-U.N. Security Council Special Notice is issued for individuals and
entities associated with Al-Qaida and the Taliban as listed by the 1267 Committee on the
Consolidated List, and therefore subject to sanctions (freezing of assets, travel ban and arms
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The purpose and nature of this cooperation between INTERPOL and
the UNSC, namely a joint undertaking aimed at combating terrorism, is
clearly permitted under Article 41 of INTERPOL's Constitution and
the
General Assembly resolutions regarding
INTERPOL's
interpretation of Article 3. Thus, rather than preventing INTERPOL
from operating in this important field of criminality by applying a strict
literal interpretation test to Article 3, the functional "purpose and nature
of cooperation" test enables INTERPOL to assist the UNSC and
INTERPOL member countries in accordance with the Organization's
mandate.
The successful cooperation with the UNSC Resolution 1267
Committee led to the expansion of collaboration between the two
organizations. In 2006, the UNSC adopted a specific resolution
concerning cooperation with INTERPOL,22 3 following which
INTERPOL's General Assembly adopted its own resolution concerning
the UNSC's request to increase cooperation between the United Nations
and INTERPOL in order to provide the UNSC's sanctions committees
with better tools to fulfill their mandates more effectively. 224 In 2009
INTERPOL's General Assembly approved an arrangement on
cooperation between INTERPOL and the United Nations in relation to
the UNSC sanctions committees.225
C. CooperationAgreement with the Regional Security System
The Regional Security System (RSS) is a regional intergovernmental
organization that consists of seven Caribbean States. 226 The backdrop
embargo). These Special Notices are circulated to all INTERPOL member countries and have
three special functions: 1) "Alert law enforcement authorities worldwide to individuals and
entities that are subjects of U.N. sanctions including an asset freeze, arms embargo, and/or travel
ban; 2) Enhance the information available concerning sanctioned individuals and entities, the
quality of U.N. sanctions lists, and the narrative summaries that describe the grounds for the
sanctions; 3) Provide direction on action to be taken to implement the sanctions in accordance
with national legislation." See Notices, supra note 14. See INTERPOL, INTERPOL-U.N.
Security Council Special Notices, http://www.interpol.int/Public/NoticesUN/Default.asp (last
visited Apr. 16, 2011). The publication and circulation of the INTERPOL Special Notices are
done in accordance with Implementing Rules, supra note 15, art. 37(1)(8).
223. S.C. Res. 1699, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1699 (Aug. 8,2006).
224. INTERPOL, The U.N. Security Council's Request to Increase Co-operation Between
the United Nations & Interpol in Order to Provide the Council's Sanctions Committees with
Better Tools to Fulfill Their Mandates More Effectively, AG-2006-Res-22 (Sept. 19-22, 2006)
(on file with author).
225. INTERPOL, AG-2009-RES-15 (Oct. 11-15,2009) (on file with author).
226. The Member States of the RSS are: Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, The
Commonwealth of Dominica, Grenada, Saint Christopher Nevis, Saint Lucia, and Saint Vincent
and the Grenadines. Regional Security System, Background to the Formation of the RSS,
http://www.rss.org.bb/rss1.htm (last visited Apr. 16, 2011).
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for the creation of the RSS was the need identified by its Member States
for a collective response to security threats, which were impacting the
stability of the region in the late 1970s and 1980s.22 7 The purposes and
functions of the RSS include promoting cooperation among its Member
States in the prevention and interdiction of traffic in illegal narcotic
drugs and the prevention of smuggling, on the one hand, and combating
threats to national security, on the other hand.22 8
The RSS was therefore created to address threats of a criminal
nature, as well as those that possess political and military
characteristics. Indeed, as indicated by the RSS itself, the Organization
"is a 'hybrid' Organization in that its security forces comprise both
Military and Police ?ersonnel who remain under the command of their
respective forces."22
In 2006, negotiations were launched between INTERPOL and the
RSS with a view to concluding a cooperation agreement between the
two organizations that would, inter alia, provide RSS with access to
INTERPOL's communication network and databases. 230
The "hybrid" functions of the RSS and specifically its role in
addressing threats of political and military character raised a doubt as to
whether such an agreement would be compatible with Article 3.
Nonetheless, considering that RSS is involved in fighting ordinary law
crime, and that cooperation may therefore enhance international police
cooperation, the outcome of the assessment of compliance with Article
3, conducted by INTERPOL as part of the negotiations between the
organizations, was that the purpose and nature of the foreseen
cooperation allow for the conclusion of a formal agreement between the
organizations. 231
To ensure that the foreseen cooperation strictly remains in the field
of intemational police cooperation and adheres to Article 3, the drafters
of the Agreement sought to introduce specific references to that Article.
Thus, the preamble of the Agreement recognizes that INTERPOL "is
strictly forbidden to undertake any intervention or activities of a
political, military, religious or racial character." 232 Article 1 of the
Agreement, defining its purpose, further stated that "[t]he Parties
acknowledge that the present Co-operation Agreement shall not provide
a framework for any intervention or activities of a political, military,
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. This information is based on the author's personal involvement in the negotiations.
231. Id.
232. See Co-operation agreement between the International Criminal Police Organization,
Interpol and the Regional Security System, pmbl., available at http://www.interpol.int/AboutINTERPOL/Legal-materials/International-Cooperation-Agreements.
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religious or racial character." 233 Finally, for the purpose of granting RSS
with access to INTERPOL's network and databases, the appendix to the
Agreement stipulated the conditions for such access, which includes the
requirement that the RSS use INTERPOL's system and the information
obtained from it "[s]olely for the purposes of crime prevention and law
enforcement with regard to international ordinary law crime, as covered
by Article 2 of Interpol's Constitution;" and "[w]ithin the limits of
Article 3 of Interpol's Constitution, namely that no use of Interpol's
telecommunications system and the information obtained from it will be
made for any intervention or activities of a political, military, religious
or racial character." 234
Thus, by applying the "purpose and nature of the cooperation" test,
and by including in the text of the Agreement legal safeguards explicitly
referring to Article 3, INTERPOL and RSS were able to conclude the
formal Agreement, which paved the way for conducting successful joint
activities,
while ensuring that those activities will not violate
Article 3.
D. Cooperationin the Context of CombatingMaritime Piracy Off the
Coastof Somalia
Maritime piracy is an old form of criminality, which has reemerged
in recent years with particularly serious consequences to commercial
shipping in the area off the coast of Somalia. Combating piracy has
posed numerous challenges to the international community in the
prevention phase, as well as in the stages of arrest and prosecution of
the suspected pirates. These challenges derive, inter alia, from the need
to engage entities whose primary functions are not of a typical law
enforcement nature. Specifically, naval forces, which carry out the bulk
of counter-piracy activities, are trained and equipped for military
activities rather than police ones. Inter-disciplinary cooperation, namely
cooperation between entities whose expertise generally lies in different
disciplines, is therefore a key for any successful operation against
maritime piracy.
With regard to INTERPOL's activities, a question arises whether
cooperation with naval forces-either directly with naval vessels or via
organizations that operate in the region, such as NATO-is permitted in
light of Article 3. Similar to the previous two examples, the application

233. Id. art. 1.
234. Id. app. 2.2.1-2.2.2.
235. For example, the Co-operation Agreement and in particular the access granted to
INTERPOL's communication system and databases enabled RSS in securing the 2007 Cricket
World Cup that took place in the RSS region.
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of the test focusing on the "purpose and nature of the foreseen
cooperation" is useful.
Maritime piracy is an ordinary law crime, albeit with certain unique
characteristics, as it is committed by civilians for private ends, namely
for the purpose of seeking personal financial gain. Thus, and taking also
into consideration the international aspects of this crime, INTERPOL's
involvement for the purpose of prevention and suppression of that
phenomenon is clearly desirable.
To that end, collaboration with other entities, such as naval forces
operating in the field, will be required. So long as the purpose and
nature of such collaboration is strictly confined to promoting
international police cooperation, Article 3 does not prevent it. A
distinction should be drawn between collaboration of military
characteristics or for possible military ends, on the one hand, and
activities confined to combating maritime piracy and bringing the
perpetrators to justice, on the other hand. Thus, for example, Article 3
prevents the exchange of information via INTERPOL's channels
regarding a naval military maneuver. Yet it does not prevent the sharing
among INTERPOL's member countries and checking against
INTERPOL's databases of information such as fingerprints of suspected
pirates, collected by the naval vessel that arrested them. A different
conclusion with regard to the application of Article 3 will render
INTERPOL's tools irrelevant, and will therefore hinder the prospects of
successful prevention of piracy and prosecution of suspected pirates.
Indeed, the importance of sharing with INTERPOL information
collected by navies operating off the Coast of Somalia has been
explicitly mentioned in the legal instrument governing Operation
Atalanta, which is the European Union operation off the Coast of
Somalia. Operation Atalanta has been instructed to collect data
including characteristics likely to assist in identification of suspects
such as fingerprints, and to circulate via INTERPOL's channels and
check against INTERPOL's databases the data collected.2 3 6 The role of
INTERPOL in exchanging and preserving evidence related to suspects
of maritime piracy was also highlighted in the most recent U.N.
Security Council Resolutions on the situation in Somalia.237
The purpose and nature of cooperation in this field, namely the
exchange of information relevant for police work, therefore governs the
interpretation of Article 3 and enables INTERPOL to assist the
international endeavors in combating maritime piracy.
236. See COUNCIL DECISION 2010/766/CFSP of Dec. 7, 2010 amending Joint Action
2008/851/CFSP on a European Union military operation to contribute to the deterrence,
prevention, and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast.
237. See UNSC Resolutions 1950 and 1976, supra note 217.
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E. Conclusion:Article 3 in the Context of Cooperationwith Other
InternationalEntities
Within the realm of international cooperation, INTERPOL has
developed a functional test by which a foreseen joint undertaking is
examined in light of its purpose and nature to ensure compliance with
Article 3. Similar to the field of processing of information,
INTERPOL's independence and neutrality remain paramount factors.
In this domain, Article 3 should therefore be construed as if it read as
follows: "it is strictly forbidden for the Organization to cooperate with
another international entity, if the nature and purpose of such
cooperation are of a political, military, religious or racial character."
The decision to apply this test, rather than the predominance test that
governs the interpretation of Article 3 in the field of processing of
information, derives from the different nature of the activities conducted
in each domain. Moreover, if the foreseen cooperation also includes
political, military, religious or racial purposes-even if those purposes
are not predominant in the foreseen joint activities-INTERPOL might
be acting outside its mandate and risk jeopardizing its neutrality. Thus,
for example, if INTERPOL concludes a cooperation agreement with a
regional military alliance according to which the information provided
will be used to fight crime, but possibly also for military purposes, such
cooperation will not be in conformity with Articles 2 and 3 of
INTERPOL's Constitution.
Similar to the assessment of requests for police cooperation
processed via the Organization's channels, the examination of a project
of international cooperation is conducted on a case-by-case basis, and,
where relevant, includes legal and other mechanisms that guarantee
compatibility with Article 3 in the context of the specific cooperation.
VII. CONCLUSION
Since its introduction into INTERPOL's constituent instrument,
Article 3 has assumed a prominent place in INTERPOL's legal scheme
and practice, both in defining the scope and nature of INTERPOL's
activities and in shaping the very character of the Organization.
Moreover, Article 3 serves as a fascinating example of a norm
developed through the practice of an international organization, based
on the interrelation between the Organization's internal legal regime
and principles of international law.
The distinguished delegate who argued before the 1976 General
Assembly of INTERPOL on the application of Article 3 was successful
in persuading his counterparts from other INTERPOL member
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countries that Article 3 forbids the Organization from intervening in the
particular case. Considering that the dispute centered around a terrorism
case, it is likely that had it been brought before INTERPOL's General
Assembly a decade later-let alone today-the outcome of the dispute
would have been different. As this Article showed, the understanding of
what constitutes a violation of Article 3 has changed in the past few
decades.
Nonetheless, the message conveyed by the delegate's speech
remains as pertinent as it was at that time: Article 3 is, after all, a sort of
a "chastity belt," aimed primarily at ensuring the Organization's
independence and neutrality and protecting it from being improperly
used for political ends.
Furthermore, while the prohibition embodied in Article 3 appears to
limit INTERPOL's potential scope of activities, it in fact supports the
very purpose of the Organization. Indeed, only by avoiding engagement
in certain matters, notably those of political character; by maintaining a
position of neutrality; and by focusing on combating ordinary law
crime, can INTERPOL promote international police cooperation among
countries that have very different political structures, legal regimes, and
cultures.
However, identifying the appropriate balance between enhancing
police cooperation and the prohibition of Article 3 is not without
difficulties. The interpretation of Article 3 and, moreover, the
implementation of this provision in specific cases, will continue to pose
challenges for the Organization's organs. It is therefore likely that the
principles governing the application of Article 3 will continue to be
examined, reconsidered, and developed in years to come. Article 3 will
thus remain a dynamic and living provision in INTERPOL's practice.
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